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Abstract
Toulouse School of Economics
Economics Department
Doctor of Philosophy
Essays on Matching, Outsourcing and Social Networks
by Rui Zhang
This thesis consists of three self-contained papers. The three papers study respectively
the impact of social network, two-tier unemployment compensation and outsourcing
activities on unemployment rate.
Chapter 1 aims to learn the role of social networks formed by unemployed workers in job
transmission. We develop a model with an endogenous threshold of workers’ job dissat-
isfaction. This threshold depends on parameters that are related to working conditions,
and it affects the frequency of job transmission. Compared with the case in the absence
of social networks, it is shown that when social networks are equal in size, unemployed
workers’ welfare is higher and unemployment rate is lower. In terms of social welfare,
social planner prefers the workers to become more selective. When social networks dif-
fer in size (some workers have large networks and some have small ones), increasing
the size difference is beneficial for unemployed workers with large social networks but
detrimental to those with small networks; in addition, the unemployment rate decreases
with the size difference. However, because of the dilution effect, as the proportion of
unemployed workers with large networks increases, it eventually results in losses for all
unemployed workers, and the unemployment rate may follow a non-monotonic pattern.
Finally, we analyze the social network investment’s strategy and characterize the equilib-
rium. Chapter 2 analyzes the importance of labor market institutions, more specifically
ii
how the wage is set, in determining the impact of two-tier unemployment compensa-
tion reforming. We construct a stylized search model where wages are respectively set
through collective and individual Nash bargaining. The model is calibrated with regard
to the characteristics of US (12% of workers are covered by collective bargaining) and
French labor market (95% of workers are covered by collective bargaining). We first show
that reducing the required contribution time of obtaining UI (unemployment insurance)
eligibility or increasing the UA (unemployment assistance) reduces the unemployment
rate when the wage is determined through collective bargaining, but raises the unem-
ployment rate when the wage is set through individual Nash bargaining. We second
show that reducing the UI duration or increasing UI level raises the unemployment rate
no matter how wage is negotiated. Last, by doing a counterfactual simulation, we find
that the welfare is lower, wage is lower and unemployment rate is higher when the wage
is determined through collective bargaining than when the wage is determined through
individual Nash bargaining in both US and France.
Chapter 3 studies the impact of increasing service relocation. We integrate Pissarides’
equilibrium unemployment model with Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg’ model in order
to study the impact of offshoring boom in the service sector. We construct a simple
two sector model and find that when the offshoring technology makes progress in the
service sector, domestic unemployment can be reduced if the marginal task-specific off-
shoring cost is large enough. Reducing unemployment makes hiring domestic workers
become more costly and consequently makes firm in the manufacturing sector expand
its offshoring scale too. In addition to the analytical result ,we do a calibration exercise
using the parameters of Belgium and the numerical simulation predicts this possibility.
Then we show the condition which makes the equilibrium optimal, we also propose an
efficient policy instrument to correct the inefficiency when the condition is unsatisfied-
the subsidy of hiring domestic workers. Finally, in a simplified two country framework of
offshoring, we show that the progress of offshoring technology reduces the unemployment
of the low-wage country, raises global welfare and probably raise the global inequality.
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Chapter 1
Getting a Job from My
Unemployed Friends: A Social
Network Perspective
1.1 Introduction
Today, workers searching for jobs have many options: newspapers, internet and word-
of-mouth. Many reports suggest that a large proportion of jobs are filled by personal
contacts. For example, Franzen and Hangartner (2006) demonstrate that nearly half of
the workers in the Unites States and one third of the workers in Germany find their jobs
through networking. Obviously, social networks have increasingly become an important
source of information in the labor market.
With regard to unemployment, much of the search theory literature implies that all
unemployment is voluntary. Workers have an acceptance wage in mind and search until
they find a job at or above that wage; the worker’s job satisfaction/disatisfaction plays
an important role on the job acceptance.
In the present paper, we integrate the social network with the worker’s job dissatisfaction
which is the main driving force for transmitting unused job information to others. Our
main objective is to investigate which factors affect each worker’s job acceptance decision
and how it determines the job transmission frequency and unemployment rate. To do
this, we introduce the workers’ job dissatisfaction into the standard search model devel-
oped by Pissarides (2000). We assume an economy where the social network is formed
only by unemployed workers.1 When an unemployed worker finds potential employment,
1The results do not look much different when we relax this assumption.
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his acceptance depends on his disutility of working and his reservation disutility. If the
former one is greater than the latter one, the worker will refuse the job and transfer
the information to one of his friends randomly. His friend either accepts it and becomes
employed instantaneously or refuses and transmits it to someone else through social
contacts, and the procedure repeats. The reservation disutility is determined endoge-
nously, and this makes the frequency of job transmission become endogenous as well.
When workers become more selective, they are less likely to accept jobs and hence the
frequency of job transmission becomes higher.
For the first analysis, we focus on the case where social networks equal in size. An unem-
ployed worker can hear about jobs either through formal channels, like advertisements
and newspapers, or through social contacts. As we show above, when the job informa-
tion arrives, accepting it or not depends on whether the worker’s disutility of accepting
this job is lower than the threshold disutility. We find that this threshold depends on a
group of parameters associated with the state of the labor market. When wages increase
or equivalently productivity improves, we have a higher threshold. On this condition,
unemployed workers become less selective and more likely to accept jobs, leading to a
lower frequency of job transmission. This is because higher wages can raise the expected
return on the job. However, when the vacancy rate becomes higher, we have a lower
threshold disutility, and unemployed workers become more selective and less likely to
accept jobs. This is because unemployed workers place a higher value on their other
options. Consequently, this leads a higher frequency of job transmission. When we look
at the impact of social networks on the unemployment rate which depends on the job
acceptance rate, we find that a higher probability of hearing job information has two
effects on the unemployment rate. Extensively it raises the job acceptance rate and has
negative impact on unemployment rate. But intensively, workers become more selective
because of the better outside options which makes them become less likely to accept the
job, and this has positive impact on unemployment rate. With our set-up, the latter
effect dominates the former one when the job transmission is not perfectly efficient. And
we also find that the unemployment rate decreases with the threshold disutility.
For the second analysis, we investigate the social planner’s objective which is to maximize
the social welfare. When the workers become more selective, both unemployed and
employed workers’ welfare improve. However, this will lead to higher unemployment
rate, making more workers become unemployed and have lower welfare. Therefore,
higher cutoff disutility also generates some social costs. We prove that the gain from
reducing cutoff disutility outweigh the lose. Consequently social planner prefers that
workers become more selective than in the equilibrium. This is due to the externality,
when workers become more selective, they not only improve their own welfare, they also
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have a greater chance of providing job information to others and making other workers
better off.
Next, we extend the model by introducing a difference in the size of social networks. In
this economy, some unemployed workers have large networks and some have small ones.
In each network, people not only have friends with large networks, but also those with
small ones. First, we find that when the network’s size difference increases(extensively),
the unemployed workers who have large networks will benefit and those who have small
ones will lose. In addition, the cutoff value of disutility decreases for those unemployed
workers who have large networks but increases for those who have small ones. As
unemployed workers with large networks are more sensitive to the size difference, an
increase in their job acceptance rate dominates the decrease in the job acceptance rate
of the unemployed workers with small networks and unemployment rate will decrease.
Second, we find that as the proportion of unemployed workers who have large networks
increases in each network (intensively), all unemployed workers are hurt because of the
dilution effect. When one unemployed worker has relatively more social friends, the
probability that they transmit job information to him decreases since they have large
networks and he is more likely to get information from a friend with a small network. In
terms of the unemployment rate, we find that it may follow a non-monotonicity pattern
with respect to the proportion of unemployed workers with large networks. When the
proportion of workers who have large networks is very small, the composition effect will
dominate and this drives down the unemployment rate.
Lastly, we try to see the strategy of the investment in the social network. To do this, we
endogenize the proportion of unemployed workers who have large networks. How large
will be the proportion depends on how many unemployed workers make investments in
expanding their networks. We show that if the investment cost is high, there will be
no investment at all; this is the unique equilibrium. On the contrary, if the investment
cost is low, all the unemployed workers with small networks will invest in expanding
their networks until all of the unemployed workers have large networks, this is also the
unique equilibrium. Finally, if the investment cost is moderate, the condition becomes
more complicated. There will be many pure Nash equilibria and symmetric mixed Nash
equilibrium. Analytically we illustrate that when the investment cost decreases or the
size difference increases, the proportion of unemployed workers with large social networks
becomes higher.
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1.1.1 Literature Review
These days, there has been much interest in analyzing the role of the social networks.
The earliest paper to study social contacts is Boorman [2], in which he analyzes the
optimal investment’s choice between strong ties and weak ties. Wasserman and Faust
(1994) provide a very detailed look at many important issues associated with social
network: measuring power and centrality and showing the roles of different social ties.
Additionally, as game theory developed significantly over the past few years, some studies
use game theoretic reasoning to evaluate the individual’s self-organizing network. Based
on this, people build social network strategically rather than randomly.2
If we wish to analyze the responses of the labor market to the social network, Calvo-
Armengol and Matthew O. Jackson(2004) provide the most relevant theoretical per-
spective. They show that social contacts raise employment probability and wages, while
network size differences induce inequality. When Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2005) re-
analyze the effect of the social network, they find that as the network size increases, job
matches may decrease and the equilibrium in the decentralized market is not efficient
because of the externality. A common feature among these papers is that the unem-
ployed workers get job information from the employed workers. In our paper, however,
we propose a new channel of job transmission.
In addition to the theoretical literatures, many empirical studies also demonstrate the
importance of social networks in labor market. Mark Granovetter (1995) finds that more
than 50 percent of jobs were obtained through social contacts in Massachusetts. Similar
evidence is also reported by Franzen and Hangartner (2006), in which they show that
more than 40 percent of the workers in the U.S. and one third of the workers in Germany
get jobs though social contacts. Many other empirical studies document similar results.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we construct the basic ingre-
dients and describe a simple model in which job information can be transmitted among
unemployed workers. We solve the model under the condition of identical network size.
In section 3, we try to analyze the social planner’s objective and compare the equilib-
rium with the social optimum. In section 4, we extend the model by introducing the
difference in the size of social networks and try to establish the impact of the increasing
size difference and the increasing proportion of workers having large networks. In section
5, we try to see the strategic investment in expanding social networks and characterize
the equilibrium. Section 6 concludes.
2See Calvo-Armengol , Job Contact Networks, 2000 and M.O. Jackson, A survey of models of network
formation, stability and efficiency, 2003
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1.2 Social Network with Identical Size
1.2.1 Setup
In our model, we assume that when a worker is employed, he can get benefits, but must
simultaneously pay some costs which are dependent on his degree of job satisfaction.
The more he dislikes his job, the higher the cost. Here α ∈ [0, 1] represents this cost of
working or disutility.
The value of α is observed before an individual decides whether or not to accept the job
and the cost will start when the job and unemployed worker are matched.3 In addition, α
is job-worker-specific. Each unemployed worker will have different α from doing different
jobs. Given that the workers are rational, each of them only accepts the job he does not
dislike that much. That is, working should be at least as good as being unemployed.
In order to distinguish between ”dislike” and ”does not dislike” in our model, I define
α ∈ [0, 1] as the cutoff disutility above which a worker dislikes the job. Here, workers
are homogeneous and have the same cutoff. Larger α means that the workers are more
selective. If an unemployed worker i, has the working utility αi, which is lower than
the cutoff α, he will accept the job that he hears about. On the contrary, if αi > α,
he will refuse it. For each job, different workers have different preferences. Within the
social network, the jobs that are rejected will not be wasted; the unemployed workers
will transmit them to their friends.
For simplification, we assume that all unemployed workers have an identical social net-
work size s, and members in each network are all unemployed. Time is discrete and
continuous, at each end of period t, the unemployment and employment rates are re-
spectively equal to ut and 1 − ut. Period t + 1 begins with these unemployment and
employment rates. In each period , V vacancies are posted and there is no stock of old
job vacancies. If a vacant job is not filled, the firm will repost it in the next period.
The job arrival rate in each period is equal to v = V/n, where n is the total number of
employed and unemployed workers. Each worker can hear job information directly from
an employer with identical probability v, or they can hear indirectly from friends in the
social network. These two events are not independent, an unemployed worker may hear
about more than one vacant job at each period.
As mentioned above, when an unemployed receives job information (which may come
from two channels) at time t , he may accept it or refuse it, basing his decision on his
own taste αi, as well as the cutoff disutility level α. If αi > α, he refuses the job and
transfers the information randomly to one of his unemployed friends.
3I assume that unemployed workers can know perfectly the disutlity of the job he hears.
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Next, I analyze the simplest case: a social network with segregation. Under this condi-
tion, an unemployed worker only knows unemployed friends. Although this is generally
not the case (workers usually have opportunities to know employed as well), this as-
sumption simplifies everything without losing generality.
1.2.2 Social Network Formed by Unemployed Workers
1.2.2.1 Probability of Hearing a Job
Here we consider the social network with segregation; each unemployed worker knows s
unemployed friends but does not know any employed friends. To simplify the compu-
tation, we assume that the network size is sufficiently large, and the worker’s disutility
α ∼ F (α) is continuously distributed in each network. If everybody can hear job infor-
mation, a fraction of 1− F (α) of jobs will be rejected.4
We assume that each unemployed worker hears job information with probability ht at
time t. Consequently, the information that can be transmitted in each network is s[1−
F (α)]ht. We assume that there are some information missing during the transmission.
So there is λs[1 − F (α)]ht information are eventually circulated in the social network,
λ ∈ [0, 1] captures the efficiency of information transmission, the higher λ, the more
efficient of job transmission. Moreover, each unemployed worker shares the available
information with s− 1 other unemployed workers. Therefore, the probability of hearing
information from his unemployed friends at time t is λs[1−F (α)]ht
s
, which can be simplified
into the form λ[1− F (α)]ht.
With segregation, the information received by employed workers will be wasted. Because
unemployed workers hear about the jobs either directly from employer with probability
v, or indirectly from network contacts with probability λs[1−F (α)]ht
s
, these two events
are not exclusive. A worker may get job information from both friends and employers
simultaneously.
Therefore, the probability of hearing job information in equilibrium at time t is given
by




4In fact, problems may arise when the network is not large enough. For example, in one fixed social
network, there are four unemployed workers whose α < α, and five unemployed workers whose α > α. If
one worker’s disutility on a job that he hears, α, is lower than the cutoff α, it means that there are five
unemployed workers who may deliver their job information to him. On the contrary, if a worker’s α > α,
four unemployed workers may deliver their job information to him. clearly, the probability of hearing
job information from the network will be different in those two cases. To solve this problem, I assume
the network size is sufficiently large and that tastes and preferences of its members is continuously
distributed. Then I can approximate the fraction of unemployed workers who refuse the job offer by
1− F (α) without taking into consideration each network owner’s status.
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ht appears on both sides of the equation but with different senses. On the left hand
side, ht represents the probability of an unemployed worker, i, hearing about a job, and
on the right hand side, ht represents the probability that each i’s friends hears a job
information. They are equal because all unemployed workers have the same network size
and workers are homogenous. In the equilibrium hi = h−i,∃i. Additionally, from the
equation (1), it appears that the size s has no impact on the probability of hearing job
information for each unemployed worker. That is because s has two effects on ht, and
when the network sizes are identical, these two effects balance each other. Extensively,
as s is larger, each unemployed worker has more contacts, and therefore more potential
chances to hear about a job. This will have a positive effect on ht. But intensively, a
larger s means that each of i’s network mates also has more contacts, so increasing the
number of i’s competitors will drive down the probability of hearing job information
from his friend, this has a negative effect on ht.
5
Since in each period, we have the same number of vacancies V and working population
n, we do not need to take into consideration the time difference. After simplification,
we have
h = v + λ[1− F (α)]h




1− λ(1− F (α))
(1.2)
To simplify our analysis, I assume that the α is uniformly and continuously distributed





Clearly, the probability of hearing job information h is higher than that without network
v, h > v. Therefore, having a social network can raise the probability of hearing job
information.
Then we derive the probability of hearing job information and the probability of accept-
ing job respectively with respect to the cutoff disutility, we have:
5 We later make an extension where the network size is different across the unemployed population.
In that case, positive and negative effects of s on ht cannot balance each other.












[1− λ(1 − α)]2
> 0
Lemma 1.1.
i) When the disutility α decreases, the probability of hearing job information becomes
higher;
ii) When the disutility α decreases, the probability of accepting job information becomes
lower.
Therefore, when unemployed workers are more selective, the probability of hearing job
information becomes higher since the frequency of job transmission is higher. However,
the probability of accepting job information becomes lower.
1.2.2.2 Workers
As each worker has a cost α when he is matched with a job. We assume α is constant
and the job turn-over’s cost is high enough; there will be no on-the-job search problem.6
The welfare of an employed worker at time t is
VE,t(αt) = w − αt +
1
1 + r
[(1− δ)EtVE,t+1(αt) + δEtVU,t+1]
This formula tells us that the welfare of an employed worker today is equal to his
wage minus his disutility w − αt and discount factor, multiplied by his expected future
welfare. His expected future welfare is equal to the probability that he is employed 1− δ
multiplied by the expected welfare of being unemployed in the future EtVE,t+1(αt), plus
the probability that he is unemployed in the future δ multiplied by the expected welfare
of being unemployed EtVU,t+1.
Similarly, we can measure the welfare of the unemployed worker






VE,t+1(αt+1)dF (α) + (1− hα)EtVU,t+1]
6In the next period, each worker may receive new job information which may bring him lower α, but
he has to stay in his old position.
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An unemployed worker’s probability of accepting a job between t and t+ 1 is hF (α) =
hα, and his probability of staying unemployed is 1 − hα. The present welfare of an
unemployed worker equals the present profit which is 0 and discounted expected future
welfare which equals the expected welfare of being employed hα
∫ α
0 VE,t+1(αt+1)dF (α) =
h
∫ α
0 VE,t+1(αt+1)dα, plus the expected welfare if he remains unemployed which is 1−hα
times the expected welfare of staying unemployed in the future EtVU,t+1.
The formulas above show us the general form of worker’s welfare. Because we assume
that each worker’s disutility on one job remains constant along the time and there is
no on-the-job search, we have constant VE and VU for each specific α. This gives the
simplified formulas
VE = w − α+
1
1 + r







VE(α)dα + (1− hα)VU ] (1.5)
When the disutility of an unemployed worker α is equal to the cutoff disulity level α,
and the welfare of being employed is the same as for being unemployed, we have the
cutoff condition
VE(α) = VU (1.6)
From (4), (5) and (6), we obtain the following three equations
rVU = (w − α)(1 + r) (1.7)
(r + δ)VE = (1 + r)(w − α) +
δ(1 + r)
r
(w − α) (1.8)




From (7) and (8), we can see that both VE and VU decrease with α, thus the cutoff
value of disutility α plays a negative role on the welfare of workers. Intuitively, as
unemployed workers become more selective, α is lower, the profit from working is higher
at the cutoff. However, the frequency of job transmission will be higher because more
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unemployed workers will transfer the job information that they rejected to others. This
will raise both the probability of hearing jobs and the expected welfare.



















After simplifying the equation, we have a very important equation
hα2 + 2(r + δ)α = 2(r + δ)w (1.10)
The threshold disutility α in the equilibrium is determined by a group of parameters
related to the labor market, such as w, h, r, and δ. However we should take into
consideration that h is also a function of α as h = v1−λ(1−α) , then we have
vα2
1− λ(1− α)
+ 2(r + δ)α = 2(r + δ)w (1.11)
Apparently α is determined by r, δ, w and v. We derive α with respect to the vacancy









+ 2(r + δ)
< 0







+ 2(r + δ)
> 0
Finally, we derive it with respect to the discount rate r and the destruction rate δ, and





i) As the vacancy rate v increases, the cutoff value of disutility α decreases;
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ii) As the wage w increases, the cutoff value of disutility α increases;
iii) The cutoff value of disutility α increases both with the discount rate r and the job
destruction rate δ.
These results are intuitive, let us first take a look at the impact of vacancy rate v
on α. As the vacancy rate becomes higher, there are more job opportunities for each
worker which means that they have higher value of outside option, and therefore be-
come more selective. In particular, those unemployed workers at the margin who would
have otherwise accepted the job opportunity will now reject it because there are more
opportunities.
Second, as the wage rate w becomes higher, working brings unemployed workers a higher
reward and raises their expected return. When given a higher wage level, workers become
less selective and more likely to accept the job.
Finally, we can observe that both the discount rate r and the job destruction rate δ have
a positive impact on α. The higher these rates, the lower the present value of the future
worker’s welfare. Therefore the job’s perspective deteriorate, and workers become less
selective.
The threshold disutility of working α depends on the outside economic environment, and
indirectly impacts the frequency of job transmission in each social network, s(1 − α) v
α
.
When workers become more selective, α is lower, and they transmit job information
more frequently.
1.2.2.3 Unemployment Rate in the Steady State
In each period, a job is destroyed with probability δ. ut is the unemployment rate and
1 − ut is the employment rate at the end of period t. The resulting employment rate
after the job filling process is 1 − ut + uthtF (α), uthtF (α) is the probability that an
unemployed worker is newly employed whereas 1−ut is the probability that an existing
job is not destroyed. At the end of period t, the employment rate is
1− ut+1 = (1− δ)[1 − ut + uthtF (α)]
By assuming a uniform distribution of α, we have the steady state unemployment rate
u =
δ
δ + (1− δ)hα
=
δ
δ + (1− δ) vα1−λ(1−α)
(1.12)
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We can observe that the unemployment rate is a function of several parameters, such as
the job depreciation rate and job arrival rate.The equilibrium condition gives us
vα
1− λ(1− α)




The derivation of vα1−λ(1−α) with respect to v is
∂[ vα1−λ(1−α) ]
∂v




Therefore when the vacancy rate becomes higher, vα1−λ(1−α) goes up and unemployment
rate becomes lower. Similarly, when the wage becomes higher, α increases and vα1−λ(1−α)
also increases, this drives down the unemployment rate.
Proposition 1.3.
i) As the vacancy rate v increases, the unemployment rate decreases;
ii) As the wage w increases, the unemployment rate decreases.
When there are more vacancies, though workers become more selective and have lower
probability of accepting jobs, the first order effect of increasing vacancy rate v domi-
nates and drives down the unemployment rate. Higher wages make workers become less
selective and accept jobs more frequently, this also drives down the unemployment rate.
1.2.2.4 Network Effect
Clearly, with social networks, unemployed workers can hear job information with higher






2hα+ 2(r + δ)
< 0
The results show that the cutoff value of disutility decreases with the probability of
hearing about a job because the probability of hearing job information with a social
network h is greater than without it v. The cutoff value of disutility αN with a network is
lower than that without a network αNN , αNN > αN . This result shows that unemployed
workers are more selective when they have a social network because they now have
more outside options. According to equations (7) and (8), we conclude that with a
social network, both the unemployed and employed workers’ welfare is raised. Employed
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workers in particular benefit indirectly from the social network since each of them has
a probability of losing his job in the next period; the benefit from the social contact lies
in the increasing future expected profit.
Additionally, with regard to the welfare difference between the employed and unemployed
workers VE − VU . We find that by introducing the social network, this difference will
be shrink because the unemployed workers benefit more than employed workers. There-
fore, with social networks, the inequality between employed and unemployed workers is
reduced.
In an economy without social networks, unemployed workers can hear job information
only through formal channels. So in the steady state, we have
1− u = (1− δ)(1 − u) + (1− δ)uvα
The unemployment rate is u = δ
δ+(1−δ)vα . Compared to the unemployment rate in an
economy where there are social networks, we find the unemployment rate is higher when
people are unable to receive job information from their social contacts.
Proposition 1.4.
i) The unemployed worker’s welfare is raised by introducing social network;
ii) The employed worker’s welfare is also raised, but to a less extent.
1.2.3 Non Segregation
In this paper, to focus our analysis on the network formed by unemployed workers, we
assume that unemployed workers and employed workers do not know each other. Before
going into further analysis, we also spend some time showing the difference between
segregated and non-segregated labor markets from the social network perspective.
Without segregation, an unemployed worker knows sut unemployed friends and s(1−ut)
employed friends. To simplify our analysis, we assume that all workers have identical
network size s and composition. Each employed worker also has sut unemployed friends
and s(1 − ut) employed friends. A sorting problem does not arise here. Like before,
the network size is assumed to be sufficiently large. Here we assume that all the circu-
lated information will be transmitted to unemployed workers. The probability that an
unemployed worker will receive job information becomes
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Without segregation, each unemployed worker can hear job information from two sources:
one is his unemployed friends with probability (1−α)ht
sut
sut
, another one is his employed
friends with probability s(1−ut)
sut
vt.







Clearly the probability of hearing job information is higher than that of the previous
case in which the labor market is segregated. The dynamics of unemployment rate is
1− ut+1 = (1− δ)[1 − ut + uthtF (α)]
in steady state, the unemployment rate is
u =
δ
δ + (1− δ)hα
(1.17)
We can directly observe from equation (14) that the unemployment rate is lower when
the labor market is not segregated because the probability of accepting a job hα is higher
than that with segregation. Additionally, we have the cutoff disutility α = 2(r+δ)w2(r+δ)+hα ,
which indicates that α decreases with hα, therefore the cutoff disutility without segre-
gation is lower than that with segregation, αSS > αNS . In the labor market without
segregation, unemployed workers have more opportunities to hear about jobs. Therefore
the outside option improves and unemployed workers becomes more selective.
Since the cutoff disutility level αNS is lower without segregation, according to equation
(8), we have V NSU > V
SS
U ; unemployed workers benefit from non-segregation of the labor
market.
1.3 Social Welfare
There are various ways to calculate the social welfare; normally it equals the sum of the
welfare of all agents in the economy, and we denote it as Ω. The objective of the social
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Normally, through maximization programs, we can obtain the social optimal threshold
αSO. By comparing αSO with the αE which is cutoff value of disutility in the equilibrium,
we can see the social planner’s preference. Using equations (4) and (5), we can obtain
the value function of both unemployed and employed workers
VU =
hα(1 + r)(w − 12α)
r(r + δ + hα)
=
vα(1 + r)(w − 12α)










The law of motion of unemployment is
.




With equations (18), (19),(20) and objective function, we can solve the optimal αSO.
The state variable is unemployment rate u, and the control variable is α. But it is
complicated to obtain the social optimal αSO directly. To deal with this problem, we
try to plug equilirium α into the first order condition of social optimum ∂Ω
∂α
. Remember
that equilibrium α is determined by the equation
vα2
1− λ(1− α)
+ 2(r + δ)α = 2(r + δ)w
If ∂H
∂α
= 0, then we can conclude that the equilibrium is social optimum, if ∂H
∂α
> 0, then
social planner prefers higher α than equilibrium, if ∂H
∂α
< 0, then social planner prefers
lower α than equilibrium.
We prove in the appendix that social optimal is lower than equilibrium, αSO < αE.
What is more, when workers become more selective, α decreases. On one hand, this
will raise the unemployed workers’ welfare, and also employed workers’ indirectly. This
is because when they become more selective, they suffer less from working. On another
hand, lower α increases the unemployment rate, and make the expected benefit from
being employed decrease, driving down the welfare of workers. For example, when α is
0, all workers are unemployed, and welfare of workers is 0.
∂H
∂α




(r + δ)(1 − λ)
+
(1− δ)v(1 + r)
δ(1 − λ)(r + δ)
> 0 (1.21)
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Therefore, when unemployed workers are extremely selective, social welfare is not the
maximum and there exists the room for improvement. We conclude in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1.5. Social planner prefers the unemployed workers to become more
selective.
The social planner chooses α to maximize the social welfare. He wants to choose a
lower reservation disutility αSO than the equilibrium value of αE . This is due to the
externality. When unemployed workers become more selective, they not only improve
their own welfare, they also have a greater chance of providing job information to others
and making other unemployed workers and employed workers (indirectly) better off.
Since the workers do not take the latter effect into account, the equilibrium is not
efficient. Therefore, comparing to the equilibrium condition, the welfare of each worker
is higher, but there are more unemployed workers in the market.
In addition to showing that the equilibrium is not social optimum, we also show how
the social optimal α changes with the wage rate w. Similarly, the social optimal α also
increases with the wage. When wage becomes higher, social planner hopes unemployed
workers become less selective and accept the job information more frequently.
1.4 Heterogeneous Size of Social Network
In the previous section, we discussed social networks in the labor market with and
without segregation. A common feature among them is that unemployed workers do not
differ in their social network sizes. Now we assume that there exists heterogeneity in
the network sizes for unemployed workers, large vs. small. In each network, there is a
fraction θ of unemployed workers who have large networks sL, and 1− θ who have small
networks sS. To simplify our analysis, we assume the labor market is segregated and
there is no correlation between θ and s.7 The probability of hearing job information for
an unemployed worker with a large network and a small network are given below














7In general, there exists sorting problem. Those unemployed workers with large networks (we can
call them “social” people) will cluster together.
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hL is the probability of hearing job information for those unemployed workers with large
networks. The first term inside bracket hL θs
L(1−αL)
sL
is the probability of hearing job




is the probability of hearing job information from his unemployed friends
with small networks. Similarly, hS is the probability of hearing job information for
unemployed workers with small network. The first term inside bracket hS (1−θ)s
S(1−αS)
sS
is the probability of hearing information from his unemployed friends who also have small
networks, and the second term hL θs
S(1−αL)
sL
is the probability of hearing job information




= η > 1 as the degree of size difference. By rearranging the two equations
above, we have the probability of hearing job information for each type of unemployed
worker
hL =
v + λv(1− αS)(1− θ)(η − 1)
1− λ(1 − αL)θ − λ(1− αS)(1− θ)
(1.22)
hS =
v + λv(1 − αL)θ( 1
η
− 1)
1− λ(1− αL)θ − λ(1− αS)(1 − θ)
(1.23)
We can see that the probability of hearing job information for an unemployed worker
with a large network depends not only on his own cutoff value of disutility αL but also
on the cutoff disutility of unemployed worker with a small network αS . As for the
unemployment rate, in the steady state, we have
(1− u)δ = θuhLαL + (1− θ)uhSαS
So in the equilibrium, the unemployment rate is
u =
δ
δ + (1− δ)[θhLαL + (1− θ)hSαS ]
(1.24)
1.4.1 Effects of Degree of Size Difference η
It is not easy to see the effects of size difference η directly on each unknown since αL and
αS have cross effects on each other and the equations are non-linear. Here we will simply
show the numerical results.We have four equations that determine four unknowns hL,
αL, hSand αS
hL =
v + λv(1− αS)(1− θ)(η − 1)
1− λ(1 − αL)θ − λ(1− αS)(1− θ)
(1.25)
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hS =
v + λv(1 − αL)θ( 1
η
− 1)
1− λ(1− αL)θ − λ(1− αS)(1 − θ)
(1.26)
hL(αL)2 + 2(r + δ)αL = 2(r + δ)w (1.27)
hS(αS)2 + 2(r + δ)αS = 2(r + δ)w (1.28)
We can observe from equations (25) and (26) that hL > hS because the size difference
is greater than 1, η > 1. Using equations (27) and (28), we know that h decreases with
α , therefore we can obtain indirectly
αL < αS (1.29)
Proposition 1.6. When there is size difference between the social networks, the unem-
ployed workers with large networks are more selective than those with small networks.
According to equations (27) and (28), we can also calculate the relationship between the




− 2(r + δ) (1.30)
Clearly, the unemployed workers with large networks accept jobs with higher probability,
and have higher welfare.8
As η increases from 1 to 10, the figure below shows us the effect of η on the cutoff
disutility of each type of unemployed worker, unemployment and difference in the cutoff
disutility between two types of workers. When η increases, the unemployed workers
who have large networks become more selective as αL decreases but those who have
small networks become less selective as αS increases. This is because the increasing
size difference will simply reinforce the advantage of higher probability of hearing job
information for the unemployed workers who have large networks. We can observe the
simulation results from the figure below.
As the welfare of unemployed workers decreases with the cutoff disutility, we can con-
clude that the unemployed workers with large networks benefit from the increasing size
difference but unemployed workers with small networks are worse off.
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As for unemployment evolution, since αL decreases and αS increases, we have that hLαL
increases and hSαS decreases. So the unemployed workers who have large networks
accept the jobs with higher probability and those with small networks accept the jobs
with lower probability. Furthermore, the unemployed workers with large networks are
relatively more sensitive to changes in network size difference because they are more
dependent on the network for job information. From equation (25) and (26), we can see
that the marginal effect of size difference η on probability of hearing job information for
unemployed workers with large networks is
hL =
λv(1 − αS)(1− θ)
1− λ(1 − αL)θ − λ(1− αS)(1− θ)
(1.31)
And the marginal effect of size difference η on probability of hearing job information for





1− λ(1− αL)θ − λ(1− αS)(1 − θ)
(1.32)
Clearly, when size difference η increases, the change in probability of hearing job infor-
mation for unemployed workers with large networks would be much higher than that for
those with small networks, indirectly the increase in probability of job acceptance for
unemployed workers with large networks is also much higher than that for unemployed
workers with small networks. Therefore, we expect that when size difference η increases,
the unemployment rate becomes lower.
1.4.2 Effects of θ
Another parameter which captures the degree of heterogeneity between the two cohorts
is the proportion of unemployed workers with large networks θ. It can be seen as a
factor which reflects the closeness of the social relationship. A higher θ means that the
society becomes more social and personal connections are more intense.
As θ increases from 0 to 1, the figure below shows us the effect of θ on the job acceptance
rate of each type of unemployed worker, and the unemployment rate.
By using the equation (25) and equation (26), we can find that both hL and hS decrease
with θ. Therefore, we can conclude that both αL and αS increase with θ. Looking at
the results of the simulation, we can also observe this trend. As society becomes more
social, all unemployed workers have a larger number of social friends, and the interaction
between people becomes closer. However, the unemployed workers do not benefit from it.
For each unemployed worker, the job opportunities available from his friends decreases
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because when more of his friends become social; the number of competitors for the
job information increases. This ”dilution effect” makes all unemployed workers become
worse off.
In addition, as for the inequality, or equivalently (αS − αL), when θ increases, the
difference becomes smaller. Intuitively, as more and more unemployed workers have
large networks, it eventually reduces the inequality.
As for the unemployment trend, the term θ(hLαL−hSαS)+hSαS determines the trend of







Because αL < αS and ∂hα
∂α






are negative. When θ is close to 0, hLαL is very large and hSαS is very small.
As θ increases, it puts more weight on the hLαL and less weight on the hSαS , therefore
the composition effect dominates and the unemployment rate decreases. When θ is large
enough, however, the decrease in hLαL and hSαS can be large enough to dominate the
composition effect, thus raising unemployment.
1.5 Investment in Social Network
Our previous results showed that hL > hS and αL < αS . According to the welfare





Therefore, those unemployed workers with small networks have incentive to make an
investment in enlarging their networks in order to raise their welfare.
When more workers expand their networks, θ increases and all unemployed workers
become worse off because of the dilution effect. However, if unemployed workers with
small networks make investments in expanding their size of networks, they will gain a
positive benefit. Moreover, the benefit from the investment decreases with the number of
investors because the welfare difference between two types of workers V LU −V
S
U decreases
with the proportion of network members who have large networks θ.
For those unemployed workers who have small networks, there is an investment cost c to
enlarge the network size. For example, they have to spend time or exert effort to make
more contacts. To simplify our analysis, we assume a constant cost c. If c < V LU −V
S
U , the
benefit from expanding network size is greater than the cost of investment, and it is worth
to make such an investment. Furthermore, the highest cost that unemployed workers
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1.5.1 Determination of θ
Currently, the proportion of unemployed workers with large networks θ is endogenously
determined. To simply our analysis, we assume that initially all unemployed workers
have small networks and workers are able to enlarge their network size. To obtain the
equilibrium θ, we keep equations (25), (26), (27) and (28), and add an cutoff condition
at which the cost of investment and the benefits of expanding one’s network balance
each other
c = (V LU − V
S
U ) =
(1 + r)(αS − αL)
r
(1.33)
This cutoff condition indirectly determines the equilibrium θ. When the investment cost
is larger, less unemployed workers will invest in expanding their network size.
We also do a simulation exercise to illustrate the impact of investment cost on the
proportion of unemployed workers with large networks. The parameters value is chosen
in the table below.
Then we can see how the θ changes when the cost of investment varies. Clearly, the lower
the investment cost, the more unemployed workers will invest to expand their networks.
1.5.1.1 Interaction of η and θ
As we presented before, both η and θ capture the degree of heterogeneity in unemployed
workers. Now let us consider the interaction between the two, that is, how the change
in η affects θ. As we analyzes before, increase in η raises the difference in welfare of
workers and enlarges the inequality of two types of workers. This increases the extra
benefit of owning a large network and clearly will make more unemployed workers with
small networks make investment.
1.5.2 Comparative Statics
Then we investigate the effects of change in the wage level and vacancy rate on the
proportion of unemployed workers with large networks θ. According to equations (25),
(26), (27) and (28), we should take a look at the impacts of wage w and vacancy rate v
on αS − αL, then we can see how they affect θ.
As we analysed before, higher wage compensates more to workers, hence making workers
become less selective and can stand for greater disutility of working. Therefore, both
αL and αS increases with wage. As for αS − αL, an interesting feature is the non
monotonicity of the relationship. If the wage is small, i.e. if w is close to zero, then
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the welfare of both workers are zero and the difference between αLand αS is close to
0. When the wage becomes too large, both αL and αS are close to 1, therefore the
difference between the two disappears as well.
Similarly, when the vacancy rate v is increases, both αL and αS decrease with wage. As
for αS − αL, we find it may also follow a non-monotone pattern, when v is small and
close to zero, the welfare of both workers are zero and the difference between αLand αS
is close to 0. And for the same reasoning, when v is too large, both αL and αS are close
to 0, therefore the difference between the two also disappears.
Therefore, when the wage or vacancy rate changes, how the proportion of unemployed
workers investing in expanding network changes is ambiguous.
1.6 Conclusion
The main goal of this paper is to learn how social networks formed exclusively by un-
employed workers play a role in the job search process. We develop a simple model
with an endogenous reservation of workers’ job dissatisfaction; someone refuses the job
because the disutility of working is higher than his reservation disutility. We find that
this reservation disutility depends on a set of parameters associated with working condi-
tions like wage rate and the vacancy rate in the labor market. When the wage increases
or the vacancy rate decreases, workers become less selective, hence the cutoff disutility
of working increases. In addition, the change in the cutoff value of disutility indirectly
impacts the frequency of job transmission.
First, when the social networks are equal in size, the unemployed and employed workers’
welfare are higher than that in an economy without social networks, because workers
have better outside options given that they have higher probability of hearing job in-
formation. Moreover, the unemployment rate will be lower. On one hand, when people
hear about more jobs, they have a higher probability of accepting a job. On the other
hand, when they have better outside options and become more selective, it decreases
the probability that they will accept a job. Within our setup, the former effect domi-
nates the latter one, workers accept jobs more often than that without social networks,
reducing the unemployment rate.
Second, we prove that the equilibrium is not efficient. This is due to the externality. The
social planner prefers that workers be more selective than in the equilibrium because not
only are the workers themselves better off, but it also makes it more likely that other
unemployed workers who can hear job information more frequently become better off.
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Next, we extend the model by introducing the network’s size difference, large vs. small.
Increasing the size difference between networks is beneficial to unemployed workers who
have large networks but harmful to those who have small ones; the unemployment rate
decreases along with the size difference. Additionally, we find that all unemployed
workers will lose as the proportion of unemployed workers with a large network in each
network increases. The unemployment rate may follow a non-monotone pattern. Finally,
we investigate investments in developing social networks and see how the proportion of
workers investing in expanding social networks is determined. Our quantitative results
illustrate that when the investment cost decreases or the size difference increases, the
proportion of unemployed workers who have large social networks increases. However,
when the wage or vacancy rate change, the impact is ambiguous.
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Figure 1.1: Impact of Size Difference


















































Figure 1.2: Effect of Composition Difference
Table 1.1: Parameters for Simulation Exercise
η δ r w v θo
1.1 0.1 0.03 1 0.5 0.05
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Figure 1.3: Effect of Wage and Vacancy Rate on αS − αL
Chapter 2
Another Look at Two-Tier
Unemployment Compensation
Reforming: The Role of Labor
Market Institutions
2.1 Introduction
There has been an increasing of interest in analyzing the impact of unemployment com-
pensation on unemployment rate and welfare these days. Most recent papers use search
models where wages are set through individual Nash bargaining between the worker and
the employer, and they do not take into account the impact of collective bargaining in
the wage setting process. However, the impact is important because for many European
countries, collective bargaining plays an important role in the wage setting process, for
example, according to OECD report, 95% of workers are covered by collective bargain-
ing in France, 92% in Sweden and 90% in Finland. However, in countries like the U.S.,
Canada, and Japan, very low percentage of workers are covered by collective bargaining.1
In a two-tier compensation regime, after unemployment insurance exhausted, unemploy-
ment assistance program and other social security begin to work, the objective of which
are to provide financial assistance to people who have no other income to meet their
basic needs of food, clothing and shelter. Both unemployment insurance (UI) and unem-
ployment assistance (UA) vary across countries. European countries have more generous
system than U.S., for example, Sweden’s UI achieves 70% and UA achieves 40% of the
1In U.S., only 12% of workers are covered by collective bargaining.
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salary, France’s UI achieves 57% and UA achieves 20% of salary. However, in U.S., UI
only achieves 30% of the salary and there is no formal unemployment assistance. Refer-
ring to the recent literatures that study the two-tier compensation reforming, Freriksson
and Holmlund (1998) first show that two-tier compensation system is superior to a sys-
tem with constant unemployment insurance. In a model which is similar to the one of
Fredriksson and Holmlund, Cahuc and Lehmann (1999) study the importance of two-tier
compensation system on wage formation. Most recently, Ortega and Rioux (2010) build
a new channel for the re-entitlement effect where non-automatic eligibility accounts for
the wage difference between entitled and non-entitled employed workers. They analyze
re-entitlement effects for three countries, showing that the optimal compensation system
is characterized by time-decreasing unemployment benefits and non-automatic eligibil-
ity for UI. However, in all these relevant literatures, authors use benchmark matching
model developed by Pissarides (1992), wages are determined through individual Nash
bargaining. They do not analyze the role of wage setting schemes in determining the
impact of two-tier compensation reforming.
The present paper re-analyzes the impact of two-tier unemployment compensation re-
forming taking into account of the role of labor market institutions, specifically how the
wage is set. We construct a stylized Pissarides style search model where wages are re-
spectively set through collective and individual Nash bargaining. Collective bargaining
is modeled using a monopoly union model where the union sets the wage at first, then
the firm chooses employment at second. Union includes all types of workers, entitled
and non-entitled, and it posts the same wage for all workers, this is different with that
when the wage is set through individual Nash bargaining.
The model is calibrated using parameters for one country with pervasive individual Nash
bargaining, U.S., and for another country with pervasive collective bargaining, France.
We mainly investigate the effectiveness of two-tier unemployment compensation reform-
ing when the wage is set through collective bargaining and compare it with that when
the wage is set through individual Nash bargaining. We show that when the contri-
bution time required to obtain UI eligibility becomes shorter, both unemployment and
wage decrease when the wage is determined through collective bargaining, and unem-
ployment rate goes up when the wage is determined through individual Nash bargaining.
Therefore, the re-entitlement effects on unemployment are different when the wage is
determined differently. Similarly, when the unemployment assistance improves, we can
observe the same results. Moreover, when the duration of eligibility after becoming
unemployed becomes shorter or when the level of unemployment insurance decreases,
unemployment rate goes down no matter how the wage is determined. In addition, we
also do a counterfactual simulation for each country. We show that for both countries, if
Chapter 2. Another Look at Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation Reforming: The
Role of Labor Market Institutions 28
the wage is set collectively, the unemployment rate and wage become higher, and work-
ers’ welfare and social surplus are lower. Therefore, setting wage through individual
Nash bargaining is more efficient.
This paper is the first one which studies the role of wage-setting scheme in affecting the
effectiveness of the two-tier compensation reforming. It shows that the different wage-
setting schemes have quite different impacts on the unemployment and wage trends.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we construct the basic
ingredients of the model and obtain the optimal solution of the firm. In section 3 and
section 4, we solve the equilibrium respectively when the wage is set through collective
bargaining and individual Nash bargaining. In section 5, we undertake a calibration
exercise using U.S. labor market data and French labor market data. Based on the
calibrated models, we do simulation exercises to see how the the two-tier compensation
reforming policies affect the unemployment rate and wage levels. In addition, we also
do a counterfactual exercise to see the results when the U.S. and France adopt different
compensation policies. In section 6, we make an extension where the union has different
preferences on different types of workers. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Model set up
We consider a two-tier labor market with two types of unemployed workers, entitled with
unemployment insurance (UI) and non-entitled with unemployment assistance (UA).
When a non-entitled worker becomes employed, he can not obtain eligibility automat-
ically, but has to wait until his or her contribution time on work is long enough. The
required length of time belongs to institutional policy and varies across countries.2 And
once an entitled worker becomes unemployed, he or she will not lose eligibility instan-
taneously but receive UI benefits for some period. We call this benefit duration or UI
spell, as we can observe from data, the UI spell has big difference across countries.3 After
worker loses the eligibility of UI, he or she will be entitled with unemployment assis-
tance (UA) which is normally lower than UI.4 Additionally, not all countries provide UA
program, like in U.S., there is no official unemployment assistance but other programs
usually provide assistance for those unemployed workers who have lost UI eligibility in
form of food stamps. At last, if an entitled unemployed worker (who did not lose his
previous UI eligibility) becomes re-employed, his entitlement will continue.
2For example, in order to become entitled, the required length of contribution time on job is 20 weeks
in US since year 2002 and 6 months in 22 in France since year 2004.
3In US, the UI benefits can be paid for a maximum of 26 weeks (since year 2002), and in France, it
can be paid at maximum 23 months (since year 2004).
4In Fredriksson, P. and B. Holmlund (2001), they gave proof that UI should be higher than UA in
optimal.
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The main features of the model are as follows. There is a continuum of infinitely-lived
risk-neutral workers and firms, with a common discount rate r > 0. The number of
workers is normalized to 1. For sake of simplicity, we assume that all types workers have
identical job destruction rates.5
The two types of workers, entitled and non entitled, we assume that they have the same
productivity, thus they can be perfectly substituted. Non-entitled employed worker
will obtain entitlement of unemployed insurance with probability σ per unit of time,
equivalently, the required contribution time on the job is 1/σ. And when worker becomes
unemployed, he will lose his entitlement with probability d, that is, the UI spell is 1/d.
These two parameters can evaluate flow effect between the two group, for instance, if
d = 0, there will be no non-entitled workers eventually and unemployed insurance will
be paid permanently unless unemployed worker becomes re-employed. On the contrary,
if σ = 0 there will be no entitled workers eventually. Additionally, unemployed insurance
is denoted by be and unemployed assistance is bn.
Like many literatures do, firms post vacancies and transitions into employment are en-
dogenously determined by a Cobb-Douglas matching function m(u, v) = muαv1−α ?la




cancies and mθq(θ) = mu
αv1−α
u
for the unemployed workers. And labor market tightness
is given by θ = v/u, where v and u are respectively the numbers of vacancies and un-
employed workers. m captures the degree of mismatching between the two or matching
efficiency. A lower level of m signifies higher degree of mismatching or equivalently lower
matching efficiency. Finally, keeping vacant job is costly for each firm and the flow cost
per unit of time is c.
2.2.1 Transition Dynamics and Unemployment in Steady State
Denote by Le the number of employed workers with eligibility, Ln the number of em-
ployed workers without eligibility, ue the number of unemployed workers with eligibility,
and un the number of unemployed workers without eligibility.
The dynamic equation of entitled unemployed worker is
u̇e = λLe − due −mθq(θ)ue (2.1)
There are λLe entitled workers flowing into unemployment per unit of time, at the
same time, there are due entitled unemployed workers losing eligibility and mθq(θ)ue
5In fact, they have different job destruction rates, job contracts of non-entitled workers are more
temporary.
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entitled unemployed workers becoming employed. Respectively, the dynamic equation
of non-entitled unemployed worker is
u̇n = λLn + due −mθq(θ)un (2.2)
Another dynamic equation of entitled employed workers is
L̇e = −λLe + σLn +mθq(θ)ue (2.3)
There are λLe entitled workers becoming unemployed, σLn non-entitled employed work-
ers gaining eligibility, and mθq(θ)ue entitled unemployed workers becoming employed.
Another dynamic equation of non-entitled unemployed worker is
L̇n = −λLn − σLn +mθq(θ)un (2.4)
Assume that we have measure 1 of whole working population
un + Ln + ue + Le = 1 (2.5)
The steady-state equilibrium number of workers in each state can obtained by imposing
u̇e = u̇n = ṅe = ṅn = 0. We then have each dynamic variable’s value by using equations










These two equations give us the unemployment rate for each type of worker. Using (5),




)Le + (1 +
λ+ σ
mθq(θ)
)Ln = 1 (2.8)
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2.2.2 Worker
For workers, we have four standard bellman equations below. The asset value to the
employed workers who are entitled with eligibility of UI is
rVE,e = we(1− t) + λ(VU,e − VE,e) (2.9)
Each entitled employed worker obtains a flow profit of we(1− t), where t is the taxation
rate. And λ is probability that the job is destroyed per unit of time. The asset value of
each employed worker who is not entitled is
rVE,n = wn(1− t) + λ(VU,n − VE,n) + σ(VE,e − VE,n) (2.10)
Non-entitled employed worker has a flow income wn(1− t). Since UI eligibility can not
obtained automatically, in average, non-entitled unemployed worker has probability σ
of becoming eligible. The asset value of unemployed workers who are eligible is
rVU,e = be +mθq(θ)(VE,e − VU,e) + d(VU,n − VU,e) (2.11)
Entitled unemployed worker get be from unemployed insurance, he matches with a va-
cancy at rate mθq(θ). What is more, each non-entitled worker has probability d of
losing his eligibility since the entitlement is not permanent. Finally, the asset value of
unemployed workers who are not entitled with UI is
rVU,n = bn +mθq(θ)(VE,n − VU,n) (2.12)
Non-entitled unemployed worker has a flow income bn which is unemployed assistance.
Equation (9)-(11) gives the rent of entitled workers being employed








r+λ+σ ](we − wn)(1 − t)− bn
r +mθq(θ) + d− λmθq(θ) 1
r+λ+σ












r + λ+ σ − λmθq(θ) 1
r+mθq(θ)+d
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2.2.3 Firm








V is the number of vacancies unfilled. The dynamics of entitled as well as non-entitled
employed workers are
.
Le(t) = mq(θ(t))V (t)
ue(t)
ue(t) + un(t)
− λLe(t) + σLn(t) (2.14)
and
.
Ln(t) = mq(θ(t))V (t)
un(t)
ue(t) + un(t)
− λLn(t)− σLn(t) (2.15)
The current value of Hamiltonian for the firm can be written as
H = A(Le + Ln)




− λLe + σLn) + φ2(mq(θ)V
un
ue + un
− λLn − σLn) (2.16)













= Aγ(Le + Ln)
γ−1 − we − φ1λ = φ1r (2.18)
∂H
∂Ln
= Aγ(Le + Ln)
γ−1 − wn − φ2λ+ φ1σ − φ2σ = φ2r (2.19)
Here the number of vacancies is the state variable and number of workers with different
titles are control variables. Plug equation (18) and (19) into (17), we have the job
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creation condition on the labor demand side
c(r + λ)
mq(θ)






r + λ+ σ
)(Aγ(Le + Ln)
γ−1 − wn) +
σ






Free entry condition implies that there is no extra profit from opening a new vacant job.
So in the equilibrium, V = 0. In addition, we assume that the productivity of workers
is identical no matter what is the status of entitlement of workers. Therefore for each
firm, in terms of the productivity, they can be perfectly substituted.
2.3 Wage Determination by Unions
As we mentioned earlier, wages are proposed by unions in the first stage. Following the
common practice in the literature, union chooses we and wn to maximize the surplus or
the rent of their members, anticipating the relationship between the wage demand for
workers, we and wn, and the labor market equilibrium conditions.
6
The total number of union members is ne+nn and Le+Ln of them are employed, then
the expected welfare of a union member is given by
rLeVE,e + rLnVE,n + r(ne − Le)VU,e + r(nn − Ln)VU,n
If the firm rejects the union’s wage offer, then members become unemployed, entitled
workers get their unemployment income rVU,e and non-entitled workers get their unem-
ployment income rVU,n. Therefore, the union’s objective is to maximize the aggregate
surplus or rent of its members given by
rLeVE,e + rLnVE,n + r(ne − Le)VU,e + r(nn − Ln)VU,n − rneVU,e − rnnVU,n
= r(VE,e − VU,e)Le + r(VE,n − VU,n)Ln (2.21)
For simplification, I assume that each union does not discriminate the workers with
different titles and set wage at the same level for all workers. That is we = wn = w.
The subgame perfect equilibrium where the union proposes a wage at first and then
the firm decides on how many workers it wants to hire by maximizing (21) subject to 2
6This set-up is also applied in Priya Ranjan (2013) in his paper.
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constraints, one is equilibrium job creation condition which is derived from (20)
Aγ(Le + Ln)




Another one is from the fact that the sum of employed and unemployed workers qual




)Le + (1 +
λ+ σ
mθq(θ)
)Ln = 1 (2.23)
The union’s objective is to choose the right wage level w in order to maximize r(VE,e −
VU,e)Le + r(VE,n − VU,n)Ln given the two constraints (22) and (23)
L = r(VE,e − VU,e)Le + r(VE,n − VU,n)Ln + ψ[Aγ(Le + Ln)




+ ϕ[1 − (1 +
λ
d+mθq(θ)




The first order conditions are
∂L
∂Le
= r(VE,e − VU,e)− ψAγ(1 − γ)(Le + Ln)
γ−2 − ϕ(1 +
λ
d+mθq(θ)
) = 0 (2.24)
∂L
∂Ln
= r(VE,n − VU,n)− ψAγ(1 − γ)(Le + Ln)
γ−2 − ϕ(1 +
λ+ σ
mθq(θ)






(Le + Ln)(1− t)− ψ = 0 (2.26)









Pluging (26) and (27) into (24) yields the following expression for wage
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+ mθq(θ)(λ+d+mθq(θ))(d+mθq(θ))(mθq(θ)+λ+σ) (−bn +
σλ(be−bn)
(r+λ+σ)(r+d+mθq(θ))−λmθq(θ) )
(1− mθq(θ)(λ+d+mθq(θ))(d+mθq(θ))(mθq(θ)+λ+σ) )(1− t)
+Aγ(1− γ)(Le + Ln)
γ−1 (2.28)
And we also have one budget constraint which is
bewue + bnwun = (wne + wnn)t (2.29)
This constraint means that the unemployment benefit and social security are covered by
taxation. As we know the wage equation, we have the first equilibrium condition. We





, so these five equations form our equilibrium conditions and we have
five endogenous variables, Le, Ln,, θ, w and t.
2.4 Individual Nash Bargaining
As surplus is shared according to a Nash bargain in which worker has bargaining power
β ∈ [0, 1], we have the following “surplus-splitting” rule
(1− β)(VE − VU ) = β(J − V ) (2.30)
For an entitled worker-job match, we have the surplus term










Similarly, for non-entitled worker-job match, we have










Chapter 2. Another Look at Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation Reforming: The
Role of Labor Market Institutions 36








r+λ+σ ]we − [bn +
mθq(θ)(1−t)
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r+mθq(θ)+d)− wn(1− t+ λ
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r+mθq(θ)+d )










r + λ+ σ
(2.34)






















r + λ+ σ
] (2.35)
The free entry condition and two wage equations link the wages with labor market
tightness. Equations (33), (34), (35) gives us θ, we and wn in equilibrium. In a stationary
equilibrium, the aggregate variables must remain constant over time. This requires new
entrants exactly replaces the employed workers who are hit by shock and exit. We will
show unemployment dynamics in next section.
2.5 Numerical Illustration
Although our theoretical model can be fully characterized in the equilibrium, the effects
of entitlement on labor market outcomes are potentially ambiguous. In order to learn the
properties of the model, some specific restrictions on exogenous parameters are required.
We therefore calibrate the model with US and France’s labor market data respectively.
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According to the data, 12% of workers are covered by the collective bargaining in the
US and 95% of workers are covered by the collective bargaining in the France. What is
more, OECD considers the French system as a largely decentralized system of collective
bargaining, essentially regulated at firms and industry-levels.8 Therefore, we calibrate
our model where wage is set through collective bargaining using French data.
2.5.1 Calibration for US (2002:1-2007:12)
Since only 12% of workers are covered by collective bargaining in US, we calibrate
the model where the wage is set by individual Nash bargaining. I choose one month
as the length of a model period, and the reference period is 2002:1-2007:12 since new
unemployment insurance rule in US was laid out in 2002, until 2007 this rule kept same.
In terms of the probability of gaining eligibility of UI, σ, and the probability of losing it,
d, I use OECD data, since 2002, an individual must have worked 20 weeks to be eligible
for UI and benefits can be paid for a maximum of 26 weeks. So σ = 0.2 and d = 0.167.
And as for unemployment insurance be, given that aggregate productivity is normalized
to 1, I use statutory replacement rates in stead of be, it is 0.27 for each month. After
eligibility is exhausted, there is no insurance payment anymore, but the Federal Gov-
ernment’s Food Stamp program provides a cash equivalent benefit for food which can
be seen as unemployment assistance, its amount is around 100 dollars per month whose
value is about 0.025, only accounting for 9% of unemployment insurance.
The interest rate is set at 0.033 per month. As many literatures do, we specify a Cobb-
Douglas matching function with constant return to scale, m(u, v) = muαv1−α. For
simplification, we set α = 0.5. And we assume that Hosio’s condition is satisfied, thus
β = 0.5. 9
About the matching efficiency, m, we also adopt its value from Pissarides (2007), in
which it is deduced according to the job finding rate, and this value is 0.7. During this
period, the job destruction rate is 0.038.
Last, the unemployment rate pin down the vacancy cost c, and it is quite close to the
value of Camille (2010) in measuring the flow cost of maintaining a vacancy.
8See OECD employment outlook (2004) for example, and read “Wage Bargaining and Compensation
Practices in France: An Overview” by O.Barrat et al.
9This is also used by C.Pissarides (2007) in his paper “The unemployment volatility puzzle, is wage
stickiness the answer?”.
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2.5.1.1 Counterfactual Simulation
We do a counterfactual simulation before doing sensitivity analysis, and we try to see
what would be the unemployment rate, wage, and welfare if U.S. adopts the collective
bargaining wage setting scheme. Comparing with the economy where the wage is ne-
gotiated through individual Nash bargaining, the wage that worker can get becomes
higher, and the unemployment becomes higher too since higher wage pushes up the
unemployment rate. But in terms of the welfare, it becomes lower. Moreover, there is
a polarization arising, for employed workers, their wages are raised, but there are more
unemployed workers when the wage is set according to collective bargaining. There-
fore, the inequality between employed and unemployed workers is raised when collective
bargaining presents.
2.5.2 Calibration for France (2005:1-2007:12)
As for the probability of gaining eligibility of UI σ and the probability of losing it d, we
use OECD data as well, since 2004, an individual must have worked 6 months in 22 to
be eligible for UI and benefits can be paid for a maximum of 23 months. So σ = 0.167
and d = 0.043.
And as for unemployment insurance be, I use statutory replacement rates. Unlike U.S.
labor market in which be can be simply obtained by using replacement rate since unem-
ployment assistance is not included in the data, all the replacement ratio data of French
labor market only give us the mean value which includes unemployment insurance as
well as unemployment assistance. To avoid such problem, I use the average wage, un-
employment insurance and unemployment assistance directly in order to compute each
ratio, and we have be = 0.55 and bn = 0.17.
There are many literatures which investigate the choice of the elasticity of match with
respect to unemployment, for France, Burda and Wyplosz (1994) estimate a parameter
close to 0.5, and for simplicity I set it to 0.5 as well which is identical to that of US.
We do not have direct information referring to job finding rate, we only have the pro-
portion of unemployed workers staying unemployed more than one year p. So 1 − p of
unemployed workers can find a job in a year. As job arrives with a poisson process,
therefore job finding rate f in each quarter is −lnp/4 and it equals 0.07.
For job destruction rate, it is hard to find direct information too. We have number of
unemployed workers u, number of employed workers n and job finding rate f in each
period. According to the unemployment dynamics, the unemployed at time t+1 should
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be the sum of rest of unemployed at end of t and employed who flow into unemployed
at t.
ut+1 = ut(1− ft) + ntλt
Then the average job destruction rate is 0.0067. And the matching quality m is deduced
so as to match the aggregate unemployment rate , job finding rate and labor market
tightness according to u = λ
λ+mθq(θ) , giving that the sample mean for labor market
tightness θ = 0.115 in 2004-2007. This gives that m = 0.2.
The vacancy cost is chosen to match the unemployment rate, which gives that c = 1.5.
This is very close to the result from Bentolila and Cahuc (2011).10
2.5.2.1 Counterfactual Simulation
Here I also make a counterfactual simulation. What is different is that now we try
to see what would be the unemployment rate, wage, and welfare if France adopts the
individual Nash bargaining. We find that if France sets wages according to individual
Nash bargaining, the polarization will arise, the inequality between entitled and non-
entitled workers becomes larger. In terms of unemployment rate, it becomes lower too.
And as for the welfare, when the wage is set according to the individual Nash bargaining,
welfare is higher than that when the wage is set by the union collectively.
By doing counterfactual simulations, we find that when the wage is set by the union,
the unemployment is lower, the wage is higher and welfare is higher than that when
the wage is set through individual Nash bargaining. In terms of efficiency, set wage
according to the individual Nash bargaining is more efficient. The union has incentive
to improve the workers’ welfare by posting higher wage, unfortunately, this will make
firm reduce domestic hires, enlarging the inequality between employed and unemployed
workers.
2.5.3 Effectiveness of the Policy-Sensitivity Analysis
In the following analysis, we want to see how the two-tier compensation policies, which
are captured by the four parameters respectively σ, d, be and bn, affect the unemployment
trends. When the wage is set through collective bargaining, the objective of union is to
maximize the total rents. The ways of improving total rents are twofold: the first one
is intensively improving rent of each worker, for example by increasing the wage level,
but this will raise the number of unemployed population which inversely has negative
10In their paper, the calibrated vacancy cost is one half of the quarter production.
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impact on total rents; the second one is extensively expanding employed population, but
this will decrease the wage and rent for each individual worker.
2.5.3.1 Impact of an Increase in Entitlement Probability (σ becomes higher)
In the case of individual Nash bargaining, higher probability of gaining eligibility makes
it easier for workers to flow into eligible state, equivalently more workers will earn wages
paid to entitled workers which is higher than that paid to non-entitled workers, therefore
the unemployment rate becomes higher.
On the contrary, in the case of collective bargaining, union posts a wage at first, then firm
decides how many workers it hires. When σ becomes higher, more workers are entitled
with unemployment insurance, henceVE,e − VU,e decreases and VE,n − VU,n increases.
What is more, since we have VE,n− VU,n > VE,e−VU,e given that workers with different
titles have the identical wages, now the union puts more weights on VE,e − VU,e which
is smaller. Therefore intensively, increasing σ simply has downward pressure on the
total rent of employed workers. As higher wage amplifies this negative impact, the
union has incentive to post lower wage w to reduce the marginal negative effect of σ
on total rents,11increasing the total hirings, this improves the total rents, drives down
the unemployment. Consequently, when σ increases, the effect of extensively increasing
employment on raising total rent dominates the effect of intensively increasing the wage
of employed workers. Figure 1 shows us the unemployment and wage trends when σ
changes.
2.5.3.2 Impact of an Increase in Probability of Losing Eligibility (d becomes
higher)
In the case of individual Nash bargaining, when the probability of losing eligibility
becomes higher, more workers flow into ineligible state and more workers will earn
wages paid to non-entitled workers which is lower than that paid to entitled workers,
unemployment becomes lower. For entitled workers, it is easier for them to lose eligibility,
therefore their outside option values become lower, their wages are decreased. For non-
entitled workers, their outside option values are relatively higher, so the wages are raised.
And in the case of collective bargaining, when d increases, VE,e − VU,e increases and
VE,n−VU,n decreases, and there is a higher proportion of unemployed workers becoming
non-entitled, for the same reasoning, union puts more weights on the term which is
decreasing, thus it has incentive to posts lower wages to reduce the negative effect on total
11Both VE,e − VU,e and VE,n − VU,n decreases with the wage rate w.
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rent, increasing the total hirings, and this drives down the unemployment. Therefore,
when d increases, the effect of extensively increasing employment on raising total rent
also dominates the effect of intensively increasing the wage of employed workers. Figure
2 shows us the unemployment and wage trends when d changes.
2.5.3.3 Impact of an Increase in UI (be becomes higher)
When the wage is set through individual Nash bargaining, higher unemployment insur-
ance raises the outside option value of entitled workers and allows them to have higher
wage. For non-entitled workers, however, their outside option value decreases relatively,
so their wages decrease. In terms of unemployment, higher unemployment insurance
increases the cost of hiring workers, thus the unemployment rate goes up.
In case of collective bargaining, when be is higher, VE,e− VU,e decreases and VE,n− VU,n
increases, since VE,n−VU,n > VE,e−VU,e, the union has incentive to post higher wages to
reinforce the positive effect of be on rents. This will eventually raise the unemployment
rate. Therefore, when be becomes higher, the effect of intensively increasing the wage on
raising total rent dominates the effect of extensively increasing the number of employed
workers. Figure 3 shows us the unemployment and wage trends when be changes.
2.5.3.4 Impact of an Increase in UA (bn becomes higher)
For all workers, including entitled and non-entitled, they have better outside options
now. In the case of individual Nash bargaining, this pushes up the wage of each type of
workers, thus the unemployment rate becomes higher.
But in the case of collective bargaining, when bn becomes higher, both VE,e − VU,e and
VE,n−VU,n decreases, the union has incentive to post lower wage to reduce the negative
effect of bn on rents. This will reduce the unemployment. Consequently, the effect of
extensively increasing employment on raising total rent dominates the effect of inten-
sively increasing the wage of employed workers. Figure 4 shows us the unemployment
and wage trends when bn changes.
And we also investigate how the change in policies affect workers’ wages and unemploy-
ment quantitatively using the U.S. labor market data. We can see how they vary when
the required contribution time to gain eligibility decreases, UI duration after becoming
unemployed decreases, unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance increase.
And we put the results in the Appendix. From the results, we find that the impacts of
two-tier compensation policies are more significant when the wage is negotiated through
collective bargaining in stead of individual Nash bargaining.
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2.6 Extension
In this section, we try to extend the model to the case when the union puts different
weights on the different group of workers. In previous sections, we conduct our analysis
based on the assumption that union puts identical weight on each type of workers.
However, in the real world, union may have different preferences toward different groups.
For example, the union members are voted by the workers. Therefore, when they make
decisions and try to post a wage, they should take into account of the proportion of each
group. Now the objective of the union is to maximize
(2− k)r(VE,e − VU,e)Le + kr(VE,n − VU,n)Ln (2.36)
0 < k < 2, when k = 1, union puts the same weights on the rent of each type of workers.
And when k < 1, union puts more weights on entitled workers. We put the computation
process in the Appendix. As before, we can obtain the wage equation
[(1−t)∗(2−k−
mθq(θ)(λ+ d+mθq(θ))k
(d +mθq(θ))(mθq(θ) + λ+ σ)
)−(2−k)(be−
d(be − bn)





(d+mθq(θ))(mθq(θ) + λ+ σ)
(−bn +
σλ(be − bn)








We also do a simple simulation exercise. From the Figure 5 and 6, we can see that
when k is larger than 1, union puts more weights on the non-entitled workers. Because
non-entitled workers have greater rent than entitled workers, union has incentive to raise
the wage to reinforce this impact, increasing unemployment rate.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I re-analyze the two-tier unemployment compensation reforming taking
into account of the role of wage-setting schemes. We construct the standard unemploy-
ment search models where wages are negotiated respectively through individual Nash
bargaining and collective bargaining. The former one is applied prevalently in the U.S.
and the later one is applied widely in the European countries like in France, Sweden and
Germany.
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Based on the theoretical model, we calibrate the model where the wage is negotiated
through individual Nash bargaining using the U.S. labor market data and calibrate the
model where the wage is negotiated collectively using the French labor market data.
We at first do a counterfactual simulation for each country, assuming that they adopt
different wage-setting schemes. That is, U.S. adopts the collective bargaining wage-
setting scheme and France adopts the individual Nash bargaining wage-setting scheme.
We find that in both countries, comparing to the economy where the wage is negotiated
through the individual Nash bargaining, when the wage is negotiated collectively, the
unemployment rate is higher, wage level is higher, and both workers’ welfare and social
surplus are lower. Therefore, from the perspective of efficiency, setting wage through
individual Nash bargaining is more efficient.
Then we mainly analyze the impact of two-tier unemployment compensation reforming
on unemployment and wage level. We find that reducing the contribution time of gaining
eligibility or increasing the unemployment assistance reduces the unemployment rate
when the wage is set collectively but raises the unemployment rate when the wage is set
through individual Nash bargaining. In addition, reducing the unemployment insurance
duration or increasing replacement rate raises the unemployment rate no matter how
the wage is set.
Last, we extend the model to where the union put different weights on different group
of workers. By doing simulation exercise, we find that when union puts more weight on
the non-entitled workers’ surplus, both the unemployment rate and the wage become
higher.
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Table 2.1: Counterfactual Results for US
w u Workers’ Welfare Social Surplus
Individual Nash Bargaining 0.59, 0.55 0.056 161.1 285
Collective Bargaining 0.61 0.095 155.6 281.2
Table 2.2: Counterfactual Results for France
w u Welfare Social Surplus
Individual Nash Bargaining 0.58, 0.4 0.064 163.4 281.5
Collective Bargaining 0.61 0.085 162.5 280
Chapter 3




Globalization is normally defined as international trade at first and as offshoring at sec-
ond which is the relocation of production processes abroad which shifts jobs of home
country abroad. A major driving force behind offshoring is the difference in factor
prices(see e.g. Nunnenkamp, 2004;Kohler, 2002). Firms that engage in offshoring ac-
tivities can be seen as efficiency seekers as they take advantage of less costly resources.
This potential cost advantage is fundamental in explaining offshoring decisions.
In the past decades, there are mainly two waves of offshoring. The first is characterized
by material offshoring, predominantly in labor intensive industries such as consumer
electronics, textiles and apparels, footwear and leather goods.1 Production has been
simply relocated from developed countries to low cost countries. The second wave is
characterized by service relocation which is facilitated by the improvement in commu-
nication technology. The OECD (2007 b) reports that between 1995 and 2000, the
outsourcing by the service sector have shown the strongest growth in OECD countries.
Figure (a) shows this trend. “Now offshoring has become a wide phenomenon that
involves all sectors 2”.
1See Bottini, Ernst and Luebker (2007), Dossani and Kenney (2004),Girma and Gorg (2003).
2See Bottini, Ernst and Luebker (2007).
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People agree that home country can benefit from offshoring activity because of low
cost advantage, but at the same time they are concerned by its impact on domestic
job security. Whether offshoring will delocate domestic jobs abroad has become a hot
political issue today. From the OECD report3, however, we can observe from the table 1
that from mid 1990s to early 2000s, apart from Japan, Slovakia and the Czech Republic,
all the other OECD countries have the net job creation. Additionally, the unemployment
rate falls during this period in most of the OECD countries.
At the same time, the outsourcing scale of the traditional manufacturing sector in almost
all OECD countries keeps growing. We can observe this trend from figure (a) as well for
some selected countries.
In this paper, we attempt to bridge these facts and to investigate whether the impact of
service relocation on domestic unemployment can be negative and what does it depend
on, how the offshoring activity in the manufacturing sector is affected and what are
the consequences for global welfare as well as inequality. To answer these questions,
we construct a simple two sector model and integrate the Pissarides search model of
unemployment with the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg(2008) task trade model.
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg argue that the production of good requires the completion
of a group of tasks. Their model investigates how offshoring activity affects the wage rate
of high skilled as well as low skilled workers. They decompose the impact of offshoring
into three components: the productivity effect which comes from the cost savings, the
relative price effect and the labor-supply effect which derives from the reabsorption
of workers who formerly performed tasks that are now carried out abroad. As for
the productivity effect, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) show that it is negligible
when offshoring scale is very small since there are not enough cost-savings caused by
inframarginal tasks, but it can be large when the offshoring volume is positive and the
cost schedule for trading tasks rises steeply, this is equivalent to the condition that the
marginal task-specific offshoring cost for trading tasks is large. And if this condition is
satisfied, the aggregate positive effect due to the productivity effect could outweigh the
aggregate negative effect due to the relative price as well as the labor-supply effect.
Here we allow the offshoring activity to happen in both two sectors, the manufacturing
sector and the service sector. We show that the increasing offshoring extent in the
service sector due to the technology progress leads to lower domestic unemployment if the
marginal task-specific offshoring cost for trading tasks is large enough, in which condition
the positive effect of offshoring dominates the negative one. Reducing unemployment
consequently makes the firm in the manufacturing sector offshore more because the
3See OECD (2007), “Preliminary results”, in Offshoring and Employment: Trends and Impacts,
OECD publishing
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cost of hiring domestic workers becomes higher. And the increasing offshoring extent
in the manufacturing sector will make the cost saving effect become greater too. If
the marginal task-specific offshoring cost for trading tasks is also large enough in the
manufacturing sector, the expanding offshoring extent can in turn help create even more
jobs . Therefore the offshoring technology progress in the service sector may indirectly
have a positive impact on the manufacturing sector’s offshoring activity.
In addition to showing the analytical results, we also undertake a calibration exercise.
We calibrate the model by using parameters of the Belgium who has very high degree of
openness. Our simulation result predicts that the progress of offshoring technology in the
service sector, starting from the present level, would reduce the domestic unemployment
and raise the offshoring scale in the manufacturing sector provided that the marginal
task-specific offshoring cost for trading tasks is sufficiently large.
Next, we also try to shed light on the welfare analysis. When offshoring becomes possible,
we at first verify that the decentralized equilibrium is social optimum when Hosios
condition holds, and under this condition the social welfare is higher than that in the
closed economy when tasks are offshorable. Therefore we can conclude that the trade
protection policy will actually make society worse off. We then show that when worker’s
share of surplus increases, the relative cost of hiring domestic workers becomes higher,
so the domestic firm will change the composition of labor hires in the way of increasing
the proportion of foreign hires. Consequently when the worker’s bargaining power is
higher than the matching elasticity, in the equilibrium, domestic firms perform tasks
abroad with higher proportion than the social optimum.
Based on these analysis, we propose a simple efficient policy instrument which can
make equilibrium optimal. That is, when the worker’s bargaining power is higher than
the matching elasticity, the government can correct the inefficiency by subsidizing the
domestic firms on hiring domestic workers and the optimal subsidy level increases with
the market tightness as well as the difference between the worker’s bargaining power
and the matching elasticity. What is more, if we concern the budget balance of the
government and assume that the subsidy comes from the taxation of the whole working
population, we find that the optimal subsidy increases with the market tightness too.
We then simulate the optimal subsidy by using the labor market parameters of Belgium
and show that if there is a progress of offshoring technology in the service sector, the
optimal subsidy increases when the marginal task-specific offshoring cost for trading
tasks is sufficiently large. On the contrary, the optimal subsidy decreases when the
marginal task-specific offshoring cost for trading tasks is relatively small. In the end, we
do a counterfactual exercise to compare the optimal subsidy in the open economy with
that in the closed economy. We find that if the task-specific offshoring cost function is
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flat,the optimal subsidy level is always lower in the open economy than that in the closed
economy. However, if it is convex enough, the optimal subsidy level can be higher than
that in the open economy provided that the technology progress in the service sector
can make unemployment be even lower than that in the closed economy.
At last,in order to study the impact of offshoring activity on the unemployment of the
low wage country, the global inequality and the global welfare, we simplify the model
and extend it to a two country framework. The firm in the high wage country (northern
country) offshores tasks to the low wage country (southern country). So the southern
workers can choose to work in the national or multinational firm. We find that the more
southern workers that northern firm hires, the higher market tightness will be in the
south. Additionally, as for the global issues, we show that the global welfare goes up
with the offshoring scale and the wage inequality between two countries can increase
with the offshoring scale.
To sum up, this paper contributes from three aspects. First we investigate the impact
of the service’s offshoring boom on the domestic labor hires and show how this impact
can be positive. Second we show the possibility that the increasing offshoring scale in
the traditional manufacturing sector can be partly due to the indirect impact exerted
by the service offshoring. Third we discuss the impact of the offshoring activity on the
low wage country’s unemployment, global inequality and the global welfare.
3.1.1 Literature Review
Nowadays there has been a big of interest in analyzing responses of employment to
globalization. On the theoretical side, it is Carl Davidson and Steven Matusz (2004)
firstly introduce search frictions of labor market into trade models. The main concern of
their research is how job search efficiency, job destruction rate and the frequency of job
turnover affect comparative advantage. Felbermayr et al. (2011) integrates search un-
employment with Meltiz (2003) firm heterogeneity model to study the effect of reducing
trade cost on unemployment, decreases in trade costs raise the average productivity of
domestic firms, this would reduce the effective cost of posting vacancies, thus domestic
unemployment will be reduced. Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) also investigate the im-
pact of trade liberalization on the unemployment by using an imperfectly competitive
framework with heterogenous firms, they show that increasing trade openness reduces
the unemployment if its relative labor market frictions in the differentiated sector are
high. If we focus on the impact of offshoring activity, Mitra and Ranjan (2010) is the
first paper to study the impact of offshoring activity on domestic unemployment. They
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demonstrate that if intersectoral mobility is allowed, when one sector offshores, economy-
wide unemployment will decrease and wage will increase because of productivity effect.
The main assumption in their paper is that there exists complementarity between for-
eign and domestic workers, this assumption will simply strengthen the unemployment
reducing effect. In contrast to their assumption, this present paper assume that domestic
and foreign workers can be perfectly substituted, then there is a net replacement effect
which plays a negative role on the domestic job creation. Moreover, we allow all sectors
can potentially offshore, then the indirect impact of the offshoring activity in one sector
on another can become the driving force of job creation too. In our framework, this
indirect impact works through affecting the cost of hiring domestic workers.
In addition to the theoretical literatures, on the empirical side, there are many literatures
studying the impact of offshoring on the employment. Amiti and Wei (2004) examine
the job effects of service offshoring for the United States and the UK, they find that
offshoring is likely to change the employment composition but unlikely to change the
aggregate level of employment. In addition, they make similar conclusion for the UK
and find that offshoring services has no negative net effect on employment. Van Welsum
and Reif (2006), using data for 14 OECD countries over the period 1996-2003, show
that net offshoring in services is not associated with a significant decline in employment.
Based on the Eurostat data for 64 countries over 1992-2004, Head et al. (2007) use a
gravity model to estimate the impact of offshoring in the service sectors on domestic job
destruction. They conclude that local workers are not at risk of displacement because
the cost of delivery is significantly high, and they finally predict that if the price gap
keep getting smaller, local workers could be hurt.
At last, referring to the studies on the income inequality due to the globalization, the
authors fail to build common agreements. Wood and Ridao-Cano(1999) argue that the
trade may lead to higher global inequality due to the divergence in growth rates across
countries. Poor countries will specialize in products that use high growth factor in
production while rich countries specialize in products that use the high growth factor
in production. Dollar and Kraay (2002) argue that the countries engaging in greater
global economic integration experience higher growth rate, so globalization will actually
reduce global income inequality. Ghose (2000) analyzes data and show that the trade
liberalization reduces the worldwide inequality.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the welfare issue. Zhou and Zeng (2012)investigate this
issue using a model of two countries and one sector of increasing returns to scale. They
find that falling cost of offshoring benefits the high-wage country but hurts the low-
wage one. The explanation is that rising wage in the low-wage country pushes capital
and firms out which hurts local workers by increasing the local price index. However,
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Fujita and Thisse (2006) and Robert-Nicoud (2008) show that decreasing offshoring cost
benefits foreign workers but hurts local workers based on the assumption that no firms
move from the low-wage country to the high-wage country.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we construct the basic ingredients
of the model and solve for the autarky equilibrium. Section 3 solve for the offshoring
equilibriums, we make some comparative static analysis and show in which condition the
progress of offshoring technology in the service sector can lead to domestic job creation
and exert positive impact effect on the manufacturing sector’s offshoring activity. In
section 4 we calibrate the model by using the parameters of Belgium and predict the
employment trend numerically. Section 5 discusses the social planner’s problem and
propose an efficient policy instrument in case that the equilibrium is inefficient and also
simulate the optimal policy for Belgium. Section 6 analyze the two country’s case and
investigate how does the offshoring activity have impact on the unemployment of the low
wage country ,global wage inequality and the global welfare. Finally section 7 concludes.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Set up






C is consumption, r is discount rate which is considered to be identical in each period,
and t is time index. In this economy, home country produces one consumption good C,
C can be seen as the final good or the composite good, and it is produced using two
intermediate goods X and Y . X is produced in the service sector X and Y is produced
in the manufacturing sector Y .





We have 0 < ρ < 1.We let px and py represent the prices of intermediates X and Y ,
and pc represent the price of final good C. In perfect competition market, the marginal
productivity of each intermediate input equals to its price, respectively we have two

























Assume the final good C is tradeable. The price of C is assumed to be taken as given
and is normalized to 1 for simplicity. Then we have
pρxp
1−ρ
y = 1 (3.6)













3.2.2 Production and Firm’s Profit Maximization Problem




A1 is the technology or the aggregate productivity of producing X in the service sector.
0 < γ < 1 indicates that the marginal output of production decreases as the number of
labor performing in the production increases4. Similarly, production of intermediate Y




4OECD(1999) estimates that most of OECD countries correspond to the range from 0.6 to 0.72.
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As workers can move freely across sectors, if we want to investigate the fluctuation of
the unemployment, we only need to compute one sector’s optimization problem. In
the closed economy, the present discounted value of the firm’s profit at time t in the






e−r(s−t)[py(s)Y (s)− wy(s)ly(s)− cyVy(s)]ds (3.11)
py(s)Y (s) is the value of production at time s, wy(s)ly(s) is the total wage paid to
workers and cyVy is the cost of vacancies where cy is the unit vacancy cost. When job
is unfilled, there is an additive cost for the firm since it has to pay some fixed costs, for




as the appropriate measure of the labor market tightness where Vy is the
number of vacancies posted by firms in the manufacturing sector Y and respectively Uy is
the number of unemployed workers who are searching for the jobs in the manufacturing
sector. What is more, we define a formal and standard constant returns to scale matching
function as





m is the matching quality or matching efficiency. The rate at which vacant jobs are filled







and respectively the rate at which unemployed workers become







. q′() is assumed to be negative by the properties of
the matching technology 5. The job can be destroyed by an idiosyncratic shock with
probability δ. Then dynamics of employment for a firm in the manufacturing sector Y
is
.
ly(t) = q(θY (t))VY (t)− δly(t) (3.13)
The firm maximizes (1.5) subject to (3.13), taking the worker’s wage wy(s) and the price














This is the job creation condition, corresponding to a marginal condition for the demand
for labor. The term py
∂Y
∂ly
is the marginal product of an additive worker in the manu-
facturing sector Y and the term
(r+δ)cy
q(θY )
captures the expected value of the firm’s hiring
5See Pissarides (2000).
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cost caused by matching frictions in the labor market. Hiring a worker, firm not only
has to pay worker’s wage, but also has to pay the search cost when the vacancy is not
filled by worker. In our model, this equation determines equilibrium employment ly as
a function of wy,θY and py.
3.2.3 Wage determination and equilibrium condition
Worker’s wage is determined between firm and worker through individual Nash bargain-
ing process. Employed workers get a wage of wy, unemployed workers get b which can
be viewed as opportunity cost of being unemployed.
Denote VE,Y the asset value of an employed worker in the manufacturing sector Y and
VU,Y the asset value of an unemployed worker. The asset values are given as
rVE,Y = wy + δ(VU,Y − VE,Y ) (3.15)
rVU,Y = b+mθY q(θY )(VE,Y − VU,Y ) (3.16)
The benefit of being employed equals the present wage plus the expected change in the
value from being employed to unemployed. Similarly, the benefit of being unemployed
equals the opportunity cost b plus the expected benefit from getting out of unemployment
which is given by mθY q(θY )(VE,Y −VU,Y ). By combining the two equations, the surplus
for an unemployed worker from getting a job can be given by
VE,Y − VU,Y =
wy − b
r + δ +mθY q(θY )
(3.17)
In addition, the surplus for a firm from an occupied job in the manufacturing sector
Y JY equals the shadow value λ. Since wage is determined through Nash Bargaining
process where the bargaining weights are respectively given by η and 1−η for the worker







Formally JY = λ =
cy
q(θY )
when entry is free, therefore we indirectly have the difference





, equalize this with
equation (17), we have another wage in the manufacturing sector
6This is derived from first-order maximization condition of max(VE,Y − VU,Y )
η(JY − V )
1−η.








This is on the supply side. Equation (19) shows that labor market tightness enters wage
equation through Nash bargaining, a higher tightness leads to higher wage rate. And
given this labor demand curve (14) and labor supply curve (19), we can characterize our













Clearly, the labor market tightness depends on the value of the marginal product of each
labor. Higher value of the marginal product leads to more job creations.
3.2.4 Occupation Choice and Price Determination
In the equilibrium, the welfare of unemployed worker in the manufacturing sector Y is




In the steady state, the welfare of unemployed workers should be identical across sectors
since mobility across sectors is allowed and they can search job in either sector, the labor
mobility condition VU,Y = VU,X implies
cyθY = cxθX (3.22)
The market tightness for each sector is inversely proportional to the cost of posting a
new job vacancy. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that vacancy cost is identical in
both sectors, that is cx = cy = c, we then have θX = θY = θ where θ is the tightness
for the whole economy. According to two equilibrium conditions in both sectors, we will









7In the sector X, the decentralized equilibrium condition is quite similar as px
∂X
∂lx







8Two equilibrium conditions in two sectors give us this equalized relation.
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That is, when there is no opportunity of arbitrage, the marginal product of each labor
will be identical in both sectors in equilibrium. Then by using the equation above and




(1 + ρ1−ρ )
= N(1− ρ) (3.24)
Apparently, the size of working population of the manufacturing sector Y increases with
the weight of intermediate Y in producing final good.We also can compute the price








Finally, knowing the price value of each intermediate input and working population in
























Here there is only one endogenous variable which is to be determined, that is the market
tightness of the whole economy.
3.3 Equilibrium with Offshoring Activity
3.3.1 Offshoring in one Sector
We at first look at the impact of one-sector offshoring activity on the domestic labor
market, say the manufacturing sector Y . We borrow the basic set-up from Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008), the home country can offshore tasks to countries with lower costs.
There are continuum of Y -tasks. We index the Y -tasks by i ∈ [0, 1], and we require that
in the manufacturing sector Y , if some tasks are moved to the foreign country, the firm
uses the same amount of workers as the firm does on each of these tasks in the home
country. That is, domestic workers and foreign workers can be perfectly substituted.
Since Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg do not specify whether the offshoring is performed
inside or outside of the domestic firm, as many other papers do, the home technology
being transferred abroad can be seen as a multinational relationship in offshoring. For
the sake of simplicity, we assume that the entire measure of tasks required per unit of
labor (each worker) can be normalized to 1. And in order to proceed the production,
all tasks i ∈ [0, 1] are required to be performed. For example, if firm needs l units of
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domestic labor input to perform each task i, then l is also the total amount of domestic
labor input because l = l
∫ 1
0 di. In the framework, l is endogenous, that is, firm can
determine optimally how much labor input it will use on each of task and indirectly
determine how many workers it hires.
In order to capture the cost of offshoring each task, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) introduces a specific term βt(i) > 1, β is a shift parameter which depends on the
offshoring technology9 and it is indifferent for all tasks that are offshored. t(i) captures
the specific cost for task with rank i, without loss of generality, the tasks are ranked
from 0 to 1 and it becomes more difficult to offshore task with higher rank so that the
function t(i) is increasing in i and t′(i) ≧ 0. Additionally it should be noted that t′′()
captures the convexity and the elasticity of the task-specific cost function with respect
to the rank of task. If t′() = 0, the offshoring cost will be identical for all tasks.
When offshoring becomes possible, if firm decides to offshore their tasks abroad, they
should pay the cost of hiring foreign workers. To focus on our analysis on the home labor
market, we assume that there is no search friction in the foreign labor market and foreign
wage rate w∗ is taken as given. The firm of home country wants to perform the tasks
i ∈ [0, I] abroad, the marginal task I separates tasks i ∈ [0, I] performed abroad from
tasks i ∈ [I, 1] performed in the home country.10 Like Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
do, we assume that t(i) ≥ 1 and t(0) = 1.
When firm offshores, now we assume that firm needs l̃ units of labor input to perform
each task. 11 Domestic labor performs tasks in the range i ∈ [I, 1] and foreign labor
performs tasks in the range i ∈ [0, I], so it should hire l̃
∫ 1
I
di = l̃(1 − I) = lD domestic
workers and l̃
∫ I
0 di = l̃I = lF foreign workers to proceed the production. The wages
paid to the home workers in the manufacturing sector Y are wy l̃
∫ 1
I
di = wlD and the





0 βt(i)di. wy is the
wage rate in the manufacturing sector of home country and respectively w∗ is the wage
rate of the foreign country. 12
3.3.1.1 Firm producing Y
Now firm uses workers from both home and foreign countries, it hires lD domestic workers
and lF foreign workers to produce intermediate input Y . lD and lF satisfy the following
9It depends on the outside trading environment, for instance, trade barriers and transportation costs.
10How much tasks firm offshores in home country I is determined optimally by the firm itself. To
simplify our analysis, we assume in each sector , there is only one represented firm.
11 It is not reasonable to believe l = l̃, because of cost-saving effect, normally firm produces more than
closed economy and so l < l̃.
12For task i ∈ [0, I ], the cost of offshoring is w∗(lF + lD)βt(i).
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two conditions
(lD + lF )
∫ I
0
di = lF (3.27)
(lD + lF )(1− I) = lD (3.28)





















− cY V DY (s)− c
FV FY (s)]ds (3.30)
V DY is the number of vacancies posted in the home country and respectively V
F
Y is the
number of vacancies posted in the foreign country. As we assumed before, there is no
search friction in the foreign labor market, thus the job filling probability is 1 and the
vacancy cost cF is 0. The dynamics of domestic as well as foreign employed workers in
sector Y are
.
lD(t) = q(θY (t))V
D
Y (t)− δlD(t) (3.31)
.
lF (t) = V
F
Y (t)− δlF (t) (3.32)
The current value Hamiltonian for the firm can be written as








Y − δlD) + ζ2(V
F
Y − δlF ) (3.33)
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If we only consider the steady state equilibrium,
.




= −cF + ζ2 = −0 + ζ2 (3.34)
∂H
∂V DY










βt(i)di − w∗(lF + lD)βt(I)
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∂lD



























From equation (38), we see that in the equilibrium, the marginal cost of hiring a home
worker equals the marginal productivity of the worker plus the extra marginal benefit
due to the offshoring activity. The extra marginal benefit is combined by two parts, the
first part −w∗
∫ I
0 βt(i)di < 0 captures the marginal cost of hiring an additional unit of




> 0 captures the marginal cost-savings since hiring foreign labor
is cheaper than hiring home labor. Combining these two terms, we have the net cost
saving due to the offshoring activities w∗β[t(I)I−
∫ I
0 t(i)di] and it is positive when I > 0.
Taking the offshoring technology and the foreign wage as given, the cost saving increases
with offshoring extent I.
Equation (3.36) over (3.37) yields




By looking at this equation, we can see that for the marginal task I, it will be indifferent
between hiring home worker and foreign worker. Clearly, the equilibrium amount of
offshoring is determined where the cost of performing the borderline task abroad, which
is w∗βt(I), equals the cost of hiring home workers.
The endogenous variables here are labor market tightness θY in the manufacturing sector
Y and the offshoring extent I. To compute them, we need two equilibrium conditions.
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0 t(i)di + t(I)(1− I)]
(3.40)
As foreign wage w∗is constant, this equation shows that offshoring extent I increases
with the marginal productivity of each foreign worker.13 We plug the equation (40) back








0 t(i)di + t(I)(1− I)




Then we have two equilibrium conditions: (3.39) and (3.41) and two endogenous vari-
ables:labor market tightness in the manufacturing sector θY and offshoring extent I.
Denote the term F (I) = [ t(I)∫ I
0
t(i)di+t(I)(1−I)
] and F (I) captures the productivity effect
which is greater than 1 once the cost function of offshoring is not flat. 16 And the













0 t(i)di+ t(I)(1 − I)]
2
> 0
Lemma 3.1. Productivity effect increases with the extent of offshoring I if the off-
shoring cost is not flat t′(i) 6= 0.
When the offshoring cost becomes more elastic to the offshoring extent I, t′(I) becomes
larger and indirectly leads to a greater marginal productivity effect F ′(I). As Grossman
and Rossi-Hansberg show, around I = 0, the marginal productivity effect is close to 0,
therefore the enhanced productivity is negligible. In case of flat offshoring cost, t(i) is
identical for all tasks belonging to [0, 1], the productivity effect will disappear and the











= t′(I)(1− I) > 0
14 Combining this with another wage equation of labor supply side which is identical with that of the






















15Since domestic workers and foreign workers can be perfectly substituted in terms of productivity,
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3.3.1.2 Workers’ Reallocation
As workers can move freely across sectors, in the equilibrium, the marginal productivity









After simplification, we have the relative supply of the working population when firm in









Proposition 3.2. When only one sector exerts offshoring activities, Offshoring leads
a net flow of workers from the sector with offshoring activities to the sector without
offshoring activities.
proof
(1− I)F (I)− 1 = (1− I)[
t(I)
∫ I
0 t(i)di + t(I)(1− I)
]− 1 < 0 (3.44)
Clearly, (1−I)F (I) < 1, comparing to the closed economy, more workers choose working
in the sector without offshoring activity no matter what will be the economywide as well







3.3.1.3 Price of Each Intermediate Good











Proposition 3.3. Offshoring will reduce the price of intermediate input which is
offshored and raise the price of intermediate input of the sector which is not offshored.
Clearly, comparing to the closed economy, the price of input Y decreases with offshoring
scale I since F (I) > 1. Firm now produces more due to enhanced productivities, this
will push down the price of this intermediate input. On the contrary, the price of input
which is not offshored will be raised because the relative demand for this intermediate
input will be higher.
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In conclusion, offshoring not only leads a productivity effect, but also a relative supply
effect as well as a relative price effect.
3.3.1.4 Equilibrium with Offshoring
After knowing the equilibrium price of intermediate input Y and the size of working pop-




















F (I)(1 − I)
















Here we specify each individual effect due to offshoring activities. They are respectively
the relative price effect, the relative supply effect, the replacement effect and the pro-
ductivity effect. The productivity effect and the relative supply effect are positive while





























The term in the bracket is the product of those four individual effects, we call it the
aggregate effect. Larger aggregate effect implies higher market tightness.
Proposition 3.4. If the aggregate effect F (I)
1−γρ
1−γ (1 − I) + ρ1−ρF (I)
γ(1−ρ)
1−γ increases
with the offshoring extent I, when the home firm offshores more, unemployment rate in
the home country will decrease .
If all tasks have identical task-specific offshoring cost, that is t′(i) = 0 for i ∈ [0, 1],
the cost-savings are null. In this case, the productivity effect disappears and offshoring
more will simply raise the unemployment rate of the home country.
17In equilibrium, the labor market tightness as well as the unemployment are identical in two sectors,
so we use θ instead of θY to represent the tightness of the whole market.
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Corollary 3.5. If the task-specific offshoring cost is flat, unemployment in the home
country will be higher when the home firm offshores more.
The derivation of the aggregate effect with respect to the offshoring extent gives
∂[F (I)
1−γρ





































, when the offshoring extent I is close to 0, F
′
(I) is close
to 0 and the derivation is close to −1. On this condition, the aggregate effect decreases
with the offshoring extent I. However, as argued in the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008), F
′
(I) could be large given two conditions, the first one is that there is a positive
offshoring scale I > 0 and the second one is that the cost schedule for trading tasks rises
steeply. Equivalently it implies that if t′(I) is sufficiently large, the aggregate effect can
increase with the offshoring extent I. 18
We illustrate the role of t′(I) in determining the cost saving effect by the figure (a). As
we showed before in the equation (38), the term w∗β[t(I)I−
∫ I
0 t(i)di] captures the total
cost savings when the home firm offshores tasks with rank i ∈ [0, I] abroad . For each
specific β, we will have different equilibrium extent of offshoring, steeper task-specific
cost function implies lower offshoring scale I in the equilibrium. In the figure, t(I ′)
represents the steeper cost schedule. Its cost saving [t(I ′)I ′ −
∫ I′
0 t(i)di] is represented
by the area A + C. And similarly, the cost saving for the relatively flat cost schedule
is represented by the area B + C. Therefore, B − A captures the extra benefit from
the higher degree of steepness. If this difference is sufficiently large, the extra benefit
from higher degree of steepness can be large enough to make positive effect dominate
the negative effect and simply create jobs.
3.3.2 Offshoring in Two Sectors
Then we focus on the two sectors’ offshoring activities in order to see the impact of
offshoring technology progress happening in the service sector. Assume firm in the
18In Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), they consider full employment and argue “The first bit of
offshoring drives down the wages of domestic workers. This is because the fact that the productivity
effect rests on the cost-savins for inframarginal tasks, and there are no such tasks when the complete
production process is performed initially at home”.
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Like before, in order to capture the change in the unemployment rate of home country,
we only need to analyze one sector’s activity since the mobility across sectors allowed.











Clearly, the price of intermediate input Y depends on the relative productivity effect
F (J)
F (I) because it can capture the change in the relative production which indirectly affects
the relative price. For simplification, we assume that firms in both sectors offshore tasks
to the countries with same wage rate w∗. βI represents the non task-specific offshoring
cost in the manufacturing sector and βJ represents the non task-specific offshoring cost
in the service sector. At the cutoff, hiring domestic workers and foreign workers are
indifferent, so we have two equations as follows


















Since workers can move freely across sectors, we have θX = θY = θ. Combining equation
(52) and (53), we obtain the relationship between the marginal task I and the marginal
task J in the equilibrium
βIt(I) = βJ t(J) (3.54)
In case of the symmetric offshoring where the non task-specific offshoring costs are same
in two sectors and the offshoring cost functions have the same form, 19firms in two sectors
offshore the same extent of tasks abroad in the equilibrium, I = J . And in addition
to equation (52) and (53), another equilibrium condition that gives the relationship
19 For instance, all tasks are moved to the same destination with same transportation fees.
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F (J)(1 − J)
F (I)(1 − I)
















Now we have three equations and three endogenous variables, they are the offshoring
extent in each sector I ,J and the market tightness θ. As for the aggregate effect, by
looking at equation (55) , we can see that offshoring in the service sector plays impact
on it by changing the relative price effect as well as the relative supply effect.
When the offshoring technology makes progress in the service sector which means βJ
decreases, then the firms in the service sector offshore more. If we consider its impact
on the unemployment of home country, we can make the following conclusion.
Proposition 3.6. When the offshoring technology makes progress in the service sec-





1−γ(1 − I)1−γF (I) increases, then
the unemployment rate of home country decreases.
We denote the aggregate effect of offshoring as Υ(I, J) ,when both sectors exert off-
shoring activities, it can be simplified into









1−γ F (J)(1 − J)]



























1−γ (1− J) (3.56)



























1−γ F ′(J)F (J)
γρ
1−γ (1− J) (3.57)
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Similar to our previous analysis, if the marginal task-specific offshoring cost t′(J) is
small for task j , making F ′(J) small, and then ∂Υ(I,J)
∂J
will be negative. In this case,
increasing the offshoring extent J in the service sector will reduce the aggregate effect
and raise the domestic unemployment rate. On the contrary, if the marginal task-specific
offshoring cost t′(J) is sufficiently large for task j, ∂Υ(I,J)
∂J
is positive, then increasing
the offshoring extent J in the service sector will increase the aggregate effect and reduce
the domestic unemployment. Consequently, the progress of offshoring technology in the
service sector which leads greater offshoring extent J can push the aggregate effect in
either direction and make domestic unemployment become either higher or lower.
As for the indirect impact of the change in the service sector’s offshoring technology
on the manufacturing sector’s offshoring activity. First let us consider the condition
that in the manufacturing sector,in the initial equilibrium, the marginal task-specific
offshoring cost t′(I) is sufficiently large for task i. Under this condition, if t′(J) is
sufficiently large for task j as well in the initial equilibrium, the progress of offshoring
technology in the service sector will raise the offshoring scale in the manufacturing
sector through increasing the cost of hiring domestic workers. That is, the progress
of offshoring technology in the service sector increases the aggregate effect and reduce
the domestic unemployment rate. This makes hiring home workers become more costly
and makes the firms in the manufacturing sector offshore more. This indirect effect
will reinforce the dominance of the productivity effect in the manufacturing sector and
in turn help create more domestic jobs. On the contrary, if t′(J) is small for task j
in the initial equilibrium, the progress of offshoring technology in the service sector
will bring down the offshoring volume in the manufacturing sector to a smaller extent
through reducing the cost of hiring domestic workers. For the same reasoning, this
indirect effect will weaken the dominance of the productivity effect in the manufacturing
sector and help destroy more domestic jobs. In both two cases, the indirect effect will
amplify the impact of the offshoring technology progress in the service sector, either
positively or negatively. Second we consider the condition where in the manufacturing
sector, in the initial equilibrium, the marginal task-specific offshoring cost t′(I) is not
sufficiently large. Under this condition, the indirect effect will weaken the impact of
the offshoring technology progress in the service sector on the domestic unemployment
rate. The figure (b) shows us the role of the indirect effect in different conditions, the
solid arrow represents the impact of offshoring technology progress in the service sector
on the domestic unemployment rate and the dotted arrow represents the indirect effect
,coming from the change in the offshoring extent of the manufacturing sector, on the
domestic unemployment rate.
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3.3.3 Trade Balance
As we consider the steady state equilibrium, it is necessary to check whether trade is
balanced since if the trade is not balanced, the government will change the interest rate
to increase or decrease the capital account, hence the interest rate can not be constant.
The final good will be consumed by home consumers as well as foreign consumers who
will consume it by importing. The consumers include the firms and workers. Firms use
their net profits to consume final good and workers use revenue to consume it, therefore











βt(j)dj − cV DX − c
FV FX + wxlD,X (3.58)
lD,Y is the number of domestic employed workers in the manufacturing sector Y and
lD,X is the number of domestic employed workers in the service sector X . The value of
the net exports of final goods consumed by foreign consumers is the production of final
good nets domestic comsumption and the sunk hiring cost
Exports = pyY − cV
D
Y − c
FV FY + pxX − cV
D
X − c
FV FX − Consumptiondomestic =
w∗(lF,Y + lD,Y )
∫ I
0




That is, there is part of production being wasted in order to compensate the hiring cost.
Since offshoring is a process of importing services, the value of the net imports equal
the payment to foreign workers
Imports = w∗(lF,Y + lD,Y )
∫ I
0




Clearly, the exports equal the imports and the trade is balanced.
3.4 Numerical Illustration
3.4.1 Calibration for Belgium
We choose Belgium as the target country for our calibration exercise as it is a country
with higher degree of openness. We will provide details of the choice of parameter values
and sources in the appendix. Below we will discuss the choice of some crucial parameters.
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We take the month as the unit of time. The values of parameters are based on the
observed data and literatures. The monthly rate of job destruction δ is chosen as 0.013
and the discount rate r is chosen as 0.008 based on the parameter values chosen in Van
der Linden et al. (2001). As for the elasticity of matching function φ for the Belgium
, the estimate of it in the empirical analysis of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2000)is 0.6.
Therefore, the job finding rate can be given as mθ0.4. In Van der Linden et al (2001), the
estimate of the labor market tightness in Belgium is 0.14 and hence the scale parameter
m can be obtained indirectly by using job destruction rate δ and unemployment rate u
according to u = δ
δ+mθ0.4 . Then we obtain an estimate of m = 0.34. As for the worker’s
share of surplus, we choose η = 0.77 which is from Van der Linden et al (2001) as well.
According to OECD report, the net replacement ratio b
w
is around 0.35 for Belgium.
Then we will see the parameters related to the production activity. We estimate the




given the consumption of each intermediate
inputs which can be found in OECD STAN input-output table, and the estimate is
ρ = 0.476. We take the production function parameter γ from Bentolila and St. Paul
(2003), what they estimate for Belgium is γ = 0.64. We do not have enough information
of production technology, so for simplification, we normalize the technology of production
in both sectors to 1, that is A0 = A1 = 1.
Finally, we consider the parameters related to the offshoring activity. As for the measure
of the non task-specific cost of offshoring which captures the offshoring technology, we
use the measure from Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Greg Wright (2011) in which
variation of offshoring is reflected in changes in the imports of intermediate inputs, they
construct the direct measure of the offshoring extent as
Offg =
∑
h[(intermediates purchased by g from h)(
imports of intermediates in h
domestic consumption of intermediates in h
)]
∑
h(intermediates purchased by g from h)
(3.61)
Offg refers to the offshoring extent in the sector g. According to this measure, we can
obtain the offshoring extents in the service sector as well as the manufacturing sector.





intermediates comsumption of m
intermediates comsumption in manufacturing sector
(3.62)
Offm is the offshoring extent in the sector m that belongs to the set of manufacturing
sector M , the term intermediates comsumption of m
intermediates comsumption in manufacturing sector
refers to the weight of
intermediates consumption in the sector m. In our model, the ratio of imported inputs
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to the total intermediate consumption is equivalent to the proportion of foreign hires,







We have five remaining parameters: c, w∗,τ , βI and βJ to be determined. As we do not
have direct information about the non task-specific offshoring cost for each sector, we
have to compute them by using the economywide non task-specific cost of offshoring.
In our model β represents it and it is equivalent to the iceberg cost of trade in other
literatures , a commonly used value is around 1.5 (e.g. Melitz(2003),Felbermayr et al,
2011). We also can compute the economywide offshoring extent which is 0.305. For
simplification, we assume that both sectors have the same task-specific offshoring cost
function t(.), so we can choose βI and βJ according to the following relationship given
offshoring extent in the manufacturing sector I = 0.38 and J = 0.21 in the service sector
β(1 + 0.305)τ = βI(1 + I)
τ = βJ(1 + J)
τ (3.63)
The relation above comes from the fact that for the marginal task, it will be indifferent
between hiring workers in the manufacturing sector and hiring workers in the service
sector. 20 At last, w∗ and c are chosen to match the unemployment and the offshoring
extent in the manufacturing sector.21 We are going to try two different task-specific
offshoring cost functions: the relatively flat one t(i) = (1 + i)2; the relatively steep one
t(i) = (1+ i)4. For different task-specific cost functions, we obtain different values of w∗
and c. 22
3.4.2 Simulation Results
In our simulation exercises, for each specification of the task-specific cost function, we
hold the calibrated values of c and w∗ constant at their baseline values. Here we mainly
concern the impact of the offshoring technology progress in the service sector on the
domestic unemployment as well as on the offshoring extents of both service sector and
manufacturing sector. The simulation results are shown in the figure (c) and figure (d).
Figure (c):Flat cost function t(i) = (1 + i)2 and t(j) = (1 + j)2
Figure (c) shows the results of comparative statics with respect to the offshoring tech-
nology (non task-specific offshoring cost) in the service sector when the task-specific cost
20For each marginal task, it is indifferent between hiring domestic workers and foreign workers. As
domestic workers can move freely across sectors and the cost of hiring foreign workers is same for each
sector,we can conclude that at the margin, it is indifferent between hiring workers in different sectors.
21We can also match the offshoring scale in the service sector.
22We do not know what exactly task-specific cost function looks like, so we just give two simple
examples.
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function has the form t(.) = (1+.)2. It can be easily seen that a decrease in the non task-
specific offshoring cost ( the offshoring technology makes progress) in the service sector
leads an increase in the unemployment as well as the offshoring extent in the service
sector. As for the impact on the offshoring extent in the manufacturing sector, it makes
firm in the manufacturing sector offshore less since hiring domestic workers becomes
less costly now. Without this indirect effect,we can at first see that the unemployment
would be higher because the offshoring scale in the manufacturing sector is assumed to
be constant and non decreasing offshoring scale in the manufacturing sector does not
help reduce unemployment.We can at second see that the offshoring extent would be
lower in the service sector for each non task-specific offshoring cost level because the free
mobility condition implies that the cost of offshoring for the marginal task is identical
across sectors, without the indirect impact, the offshoring extent in the manufacturing
sector is larger than that with the indirect impact, this makes the offshoring extent in
the service sector for each level non task-specific offshoring cost be larger.
Figure (d): Steep cost function t(i) = (1 + i)4 and t(j) = (1 + j)4
Figure (d) shows the results when the cost function has the form t(.) = (1+.)4 .We repeat
the same exercise and can see that a decrease in the non task-specific offshoring cost in
the service sector leads a decrease in unemployment, this makes hiring domestic workers
become more costly, therefore it will enlarge the offshoring extent in the manufacturing
sector. And the increasing offshoring scale in the manufacturing sector in turn reinforces
the productivity effect and reduces the unemployment. Therefore, with the indirect
impact, the unemployment would be even lower. And in terms of the offshoring scale for
each non task-specific offshoring cost, same to our previous analysis, it would be lower
than that without the indirect effect.
3.5 Welfare Analysis
3.5.1 Social Optimum vs. Equilibrium
Now we consider the social optimum condition. In case of offshoring in both sectors, the


























− cV DY (s)− c
FV FY (s)− cV
D
X (s)− c
FV FX (s)]ds (3.64)
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The social planner is subject to the identical matching constraints outlined in the de-
centralized economy, the evolution of unemployment that constrains social choices is the




X (t)− δlD,X(t) (3.65)
.
lD,Y (t) = q(θY (t))V
D




X (t)− δlF,X(t) (3.67)
.
lF,Y (t) = V
F
Y (t)− δlF,Y (t) (3.68)
The computation is put in the appendix. We find that the equilibrium coincides with
the social optimum if the following condition is satisfied












Clearly,the Hosios condition is verified here, that is , when the elasticity of job matchings
equals the labor’s share of the surplus created by the job φ = η, the decentralized
equilibrium is social optimum. Therefore we can conclude that when offshoring becomes
possible and the offshoring scale is greater than 0 in the equilibrium, the social welfare
is greater than that in the economy where the offshoring activity is not forbidden. The
trade protection policy actually makes society worse off no matter how evolves the
domestic unemployment.
Proposition 3.7. With offshoring activity, any decentralized equilibrium maximizes
the social planner’s problem provided that the Hosios condition holds φ = η.
When Hosios condition holds, the appropriability and congestion problems exactly bal-
ance each other. Then we try to see the role of the labor’s share of the surplus in
determining the market tightness and the offshoring scale, it is easier to analyze it un-
der the condition of symmetric offshoring where both the task-specific offshoring cost
function form and the non task-specific offshoring cost (offshoring technology) are iden-
tical across sectors. As workers can move freely across sectors, we simply need to analyze
one sector’s optimization problem, like before we choose the manufacturing sector as our
target of analysis. The objective function of the firm in the manufacturing sector Y can
be simplified into



















−w∗(s)(lF,Y (s) + lD,Y (s))
∫ I
0
βt(i)di − cY V DY (s)− c
FV FY (s)]ds (3.70)
Since lD,Y increases with θY in case of symmetric offshoring , by using Topkis’s Theorem,
we can find that in equilibrium ∂θY
∂η





As for the impact of worker’s bargaining power on the offshoring extent in the equi-
librium, we have the offshoring extent as I =
lF,Y
lF,Y +lD,Y
. The differentiation of the
offshoring extent with respect to the worker’s bargaining power gives























When the domestic worker’s bargaining power increases, it becomes relatively more
costly to hire domestic workers. Since domestic worker and foreign worker can be per-
fectly substituted, the increasing relative cost of hiring domestic workers makes firm hire




tive. Consequently, when hiring domestic workers becomes more costly, firm changes
the composition of labor hirings in the way of favoring cheaper foreign labor. When
the worker’s bargaining power is higher than the matching elasticity, the proportion of
foreign hires in the equilibrium is higher than that in the social optimum. Social planner
prefers to offshore less than in the equilibrium.
3.5.2 Policy Instrument
We propose a simple policy instrument which can make the equilibrium optimal. We
assume that there is a subsidy on hiring domestic workers, hiring each unit of domestic
worker is subsidized with t by the government . Here we also consider the case of
symmetric offshoring. Then we can simulate the model with Belgium parameters and
show the optimal subsidy level in case of non symmetric offshoring. Now the firm’s





. As lD = lD,Y + lD,X lDincreases
with lD,Y . So we can conclude that both the number of domestic employed workers and the labor market
tightness decrease with the worker’s bargaining power.
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e−r(s−t)[py(s)Y (s)− (wy(s)− t)lD,Y (s)
−w∗(s)(lF,Y (s) + lD,Y (s))
∫ I
0
βt(i)di − cY V DY (s)− c
FV FY (s)]ds (3.73)
The equilibrium condition for the marginal task I now becomes




If we do not consider the budget balance of the government and equalize the equilibrium














Clearly, if the worker’s bargaining power is greater than the matching elasticity φ, the
optimal subsidy is positive. Intuitively, if the cost of hiring domestic labor goes up, there
will be less vacancies being posted in the domestic labor market. An increasing hiring
subsidy can correct this inefficiency in the way of reducing the hiring cost. The optimal
level of the subsidy increases both with the difference between the worker’s bargain-
ing power η and the matching elasticity φ and with the labor market tightness.24That
is because larger difference between η and φ or greater labor market tightness makes
the difference between equilibrium and social optimum become larger and this leads a
greater distortion. Therefore, if the decreasing non task-specific offshoring cost leads to
a decrease in domestic unemployment, the government should improve the subsidy level
to achieve the social optimum.
If we concern the budget balance of the government, the subsidy should be compensated
by other funds. We assume that it comes from the taxation of the whole working
population and the taxation rate is given by T . Like before, if we equalize the equilibrium










































24When the worker’s bargaining power is smaller than the matching elasticity, the optimal subsidy
becomes negative, in this case, government should tax the firm on hiring domestic workers.
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When η > φ, t is positive, there should be a subsidy for hiring domestic workers.
Comparing the equation (75) with (76), we find that if we consider the budget balance,
the scale of subsidy increases with the taxation rate T since higher level of taxation
implies higher subsidy. The equation of budget balance gives
wyT (1− u) + bwyTu = (1 − u)t (3.78)
This equation gives us another relationship between the optimal subsidy rate t
wy
and











Clearly, the sign of T is positive when worker’s bargaining power is greater than the





According to equation (75) and (76), we can conclude that the optimal subsidy t in both
cases, with and without concerning the budget balance, decreases with the domestic
unemployment rate.
In addition to showing the analytical results, now we simulate the optimal subsidy
for Belgium by using Belgium parameters. For simplification, we only show the case
without considering the budget balance.25 As we analyzed before, when the offshoring
technology in the service sector makes progress, the domestic unemployment can be
reduced if the marginal task-specific offshoring cost is large enough, in this case the
optimal scale of subsidy should become larger. On the contrary, if the progress of
the offshoring technology leads to an increase in domestic unemployment given that
the marginal task-specific offshoring cost is relatively small, then the optimal scale of
subsidy should become smaller.
Finally we do a counterfactual exercise to find the optimal subsidy scale in the closed
economy when the worker’s bargaining power is higher than the matching elasticity.
Then we compare it with that in the open economy. The table below provides the
numerical results under different regimes. The counterfactual result suggests that when
the task-specific offshoring cost is relatively flat,implying small level of t′(), the optimal
subsidy in the open economy is always lower than that in the closed economy as the
unemployment rate in the closed economy is lower than that in the open economy. On
25As the analysis we showed above, the results are in the same pattern with and without considering
the budget balance.
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the contrary, when the task-specific offshoring cost becomes steeper,implying large level
of t′(), the optimal subsidy scale in the open economy can be higher than that in the
closed economy.
3.6 Offshoring in the Global Economy
3.6.1 Impact of Offshoring on Two Countries’ Unemployment
We finally discuss the two country case where the foreign worker’s wage is determined
endogenously as well. The objective is to analyze the impact of offshoring activity on the
home and foreign unemployment. we also discuss the global inequality and the welfare
with simplified model in the end. We take the home country with higher wage level as the
northern country and the foreign country with lower wage level as the southern country.
Since we mainly focus on the two country’s problem now, to simplify our analysis, we
only consider the economywide offshoring activity instead of considering the offshoring
activities of different sectors separately.
Once offshoring activity becomes possible, some southern workers will work in the na-
tional firm (southern firm) and some work in the multinational firm(northern firm).
Both the national firm and the multinational firm pay the same wage to the southern
workers. Southern firm hires lf southern workers, and the equilibrium condition gives
pAf l
γ−1





Similarly, the firm in the north hires lD northern workers and lF southern workers, the
equilibrium condition gives
pA0(lD + lF )
γ−1γF (I) + (1− F (I))






As before, the equilibrium amount of offshoring is determined where the costs of per-
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Finally, once we know the labor market tightness we can obtain the amount of labor
employed in each country
lf + lF = nf
θfq(θf )






The offshoring equilibrium in global economy is characterized by the 6 equations (80),
(81), (82), (83) ,(84) and (85) which solve for the 6 endogenous variables: lf , θf ,lF , I, θ
and lD. Combining equations (80) and (84), we have
lF = nf
θfq(θf )















Apparently, the more southern workers that northern firm hires, the higher market
tightness will be in the south. Then we undertake a simulation by using the parameters
of Belgium again. As we do not concern the impact of labor market institutions, we
simply assume all the labor market institutions are identical in two countries and they
also have the same working population size, the same discount rate and job destruction
rate. The only difference roots in the technology of production, we assume the marginal
productivity of each worker in the South Af equals half of that in the North, Af/A0 =
0.5. The simulation results are shown in the figure (f), from which we can see that
offshoring technology progress reduces the unemployment in the south. As for the north,
the unemployment can be reduced provided that the marginal task-specific offshoring
cost is sufficiently large, this result is consistent with our previous analysis.
3.6.2 Global Inequality and Welfare
Then we consider the impact of offshoring activity on the global issues including the
global wage inequality and the welfare. To obtain the analytical results, we simplify
the model and assume that the vacancy cost is 0 in both countries. We make such
simplification because with search frictions, wage increases with the market tightness,
offshoring raising the market tightness is equivalent to raising the wage rate.However it
is difficult to see the impact on the tightness directly, so we simply assume no friction
and the change in the wage rate can reflect the impact of offshoring. Then we have the
following simplified equilibrium conditions
pAf l
γ−1
f γ = w
∗ (3.87)
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pA0(lD + lF )
γ−1γF (I) = w (3.88)





The offshoring equilibrium in global economy is characterized by the 4 equations (87),
(88), (89), and (90) , which solve for the 4 endogenous variables: w, w∗, lf (or lF since
lf + lF is constant now) and I. If we combine these four equations, we will have the











0 t(i)di + t(I)(1− I)
(3.91)
Clearly, the offshoring scale I decreases with β as ∂I
∂β
< 0. What is different from
the previous section is that the offshoring scale is bounded since the number of southern
workers working in the national firm can not be negative, this implies that the offshoring




We then mainly focus on analyzing the impact of the decrease in the non task-specific
cost of offshoring on the global inequality as well as on the global welfare.As ∂I
∂β
< 0, all
levels of the offshoring extent I in the range [0, 1] can be obtained by changing β, thus
in order to see the impact of β , we simply can see the impact of the offshoring extent.
3.6.2.1 Global Inequality
As for the impact of offshoring activity on global wage inequality w
w∗
, we combine equa-









(1− I)− I]1−γF (I) (3.92)
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+ 1) , the
wage inequality increases with the offshoring scale.When the offshoring scale increases,
if the marginal task-specific offshoring cost for trading tasks t′() is large enough, the
derivative can be positive and thus the wage inequality can increase. This result is also
quite consistent with our previous analysis. The productivity effect can be large enough
to make the increase of wage in the north be larger than that in the south. The simple
simulation result is shown in the figure (g).In the simulation exercise, we try two cost
schedules, one is relatively flat and another one is relatively steep.We can see that with
flat cost schedule, the wage inequality decreases with the offshoring extent. However,
with steep cost schedule, the wage inequality can increase with the offshoring extent.
We conclude our result in the proposition below.
Proposition 3.8. When F
′
(I)
F (I) > (1− γ)
lf+lF+lD
(lf+lF )(1−I)−lDI
, the wage inequality between
north and south is raised when the offshoring technology makes progress.
3.6.2.2 Global Welfare
The global welfare is sum of the firms’ profits and workers’ wages
W = pA0(lF + lD)
γ + pAf l
γ
f − w
∗(lD + lF )
∫ I
0
βt(i)di + w∗lF (3.94)





Dγ(1 − γ)(1 − I)














Since (1 − I)F (I) < 1,26 the derivative is positive. Consequently we have ∂W
∂I
> 0
and indirectly have ∂W
∂β
< 0. The global welfare goes up when the offshoring technol-
ogy makes progress. This is because both north and south gain from the productivity
improvement. For the northern firm, its productivity is raised because of cost saving
effect. For the southern firm, its productivity is raised because of the decreasing return
to scale,the marginal product of each worker becomes greater.
Proposition 3.9. When the offshoring technology makes progress, the global welfare
goes up.
26We have(1− I)F (I) = t(I)(1−I)∫ I
0
t(i)di+t(I)(1−I)
< 1 for I > 0.
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3.6.2.3 Worker’s welfare
It is also interesting to look at the welfare of workers, we want to see whether the workers







(lf + lF ) (3.96)
Combining equations (87) and (88), we will have the worker’s welfare in terms of the
offshoring scale I




γ−1 +A0γF (I)(1 − I)
1−γ lγD (3.97)
The derivation of it with respect to the offshoring extent gives
∂WW
∂I










1−γF ′(I)− (1− γ)F (I)(1 − I)−γ ] (3.98)
When I is close to 0, the derivative can be simplified into






D > A0(lf + lF )
1−γ , the sign of the derivative is positive, but this is in contra-
diction to the initial condition where w
w∗
> 1, therefore when the offshoring volume is
small, the workers’ welfare falls with the extent of offshoring. When I is close to 0, the
marginal benefit gained from the offshoring activity is close to the marginal productiv-
ity in the southern country, at the same time the marginal loss is close to the marginal
productivity in the north, as the later one is greater than the former one, the workers’
welfare falls.
To see whether the workers’ welfare can increase, we at first see an extreme case where
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the workers’ welfare is improved by increasing offshoring volume. Since the number of
south workers hired by the northern firm can not be more than the whole working pop-
ulation lf+ lF , the northern firm offshores at most
lf+lF
lf+lF+lD
, clearly there always exists a





















In this case, though there is no productivity effect, the workers’ welfare can increase.
Proposition 3.10. When the task-specific offshoring cost is flat, if the offshoring




















), the workers’ welfare decreases
with the non task-specific offshoring cost.
Without the productivity effect, offshoring activity here simply changes the worker’s
marginal productivity due to the decreasing return to scale. When firm in the north
hires more foreign workers, the marginal productivity of each worker falls and this drives
down the wage level of north worker. At the same time, the wage level of south worker
is raised because of the increasing marginal productivity. When the offshoring scale is
very small, at the margin, the decrease of the workers’welfare in the north dominates
the increase of welfare in the south. But when the offshoring extent is large enough,
at the margin,the increase of the welfare in the south will dominate the decrease of the
welfare in the north.
When the cost schedule becomes more steep, increasing offshoring scale will enforce the
productivity effect and make it become a main driving force of raising the global welfare.
The simulation result is put in the figure (h). We can clearly see from the exercise that
when the offshoring scale is large enough, the global welfare will increase with it. And if
the offshoring cost schedule becomes more steep, the enhancing productivity effect will
strengthen the welfare improving trend.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the impact of offshoring boom in the service sector. It shows that
when the marginal task-specific cost of offshoring for trading tasks is large enough,
the technology progress of offshoring in the service sector will simply reduce domes-
tic unemployment and indirectly make firm in the manufacturing sector offshore more
because hiring domestic workers becomes more costly. This may in turn enhance the
productivity effect of offshoring in the manufacturing sector and help create even more
domestic jobs. Consequently, the offshoring scale in either sector not only increases with
the offshoring technology progress in its own sector, but also it may increase with the
technology progress in another sector due to the positive indirect impact. Based on the
theoretical analysis, we calibrate the model by using the parameters of Belgium and the
simulation result shows this possibility.
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In terms of the social welfare, we at first verify that any equilibrium maximize social
planner’s problem provided that the Hosios condition holds . Then we show that when
the worker’s share of surplus becomes higher, firm will increase the proportion of foreign
hires because the relative cost of hiring domestic workers becomes higher. Consequently
we can conclude that when the worker’s bargaining power is higher than the matching
elasticity, social planner prefers offshoring less than in the equilibrium. In order to
correct this inefficiency caused by the difference between the worker’s share of surplus
and the matching elasticity, we propose a policy instrument which can make equilibrium
optimal, that is the subsidy of hiring domestic workers. And we simulate the optimal
subsidy for Belgium and make a counterfactual exercise in order to compare the optimal
policy in the open economy with that in the closed economy. We find at first that the
optimal subsidy can either increase or decrease with the offshoring technology progress
in the service sector. At second the optimal subsidy level is lower than that in the
closed economy provided that the technology progress of offshoring in the service sector
raises the domestic unemployment, but it can be higher than that in the closed economy
provided that the progress reduces the unemployment.
Finally, we simplify the model and extend it to two country framework of offshoring.
We show that the unemployment in the southern country decreases with the number of
workers hired by the northern country,the global welfare increases with the offshoring
technology and the global wage inequality can increase with the offshoring technology
if the productivity effect is large enough to push up the workers’ wage in the northern
country and make the increase be greater than the wage increase in the south country.
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(a) Growth of outsourcing abroad in selected OECD countries from 1995 to 2000
Country E U Country E U
Czech Republic -5.2 75.8 United Kingdom 9.3 -36.7
Japan -2.5 53.5 United States 9.6 -9
Slovak Republic -2.2 45 France 9.9 -17.3
Poland(2) 0.3 40 Italy 10.4 -16
Germany 2.5 -0.3 Iceland 10.6 -36.6
Turkey 2.7 6.7 Australia (1) 10.8 -30
Greece 4.1 0.5 Portugal 11.7 -22
Switzerland 5.3 -12.5 Finland 14.8 -39.2
Swenden 5.9 -37.6 Netherlands 16.1 -42.5
Denmark 5.9 -26.9 Canada 16.7 -24.3
Austria 6.1 -15 New Zealand 18.7 -28
Belgium 7.8 -17 Mexico 20.6 -35.1
Hungary 8.3 -38 Spain 22.6 -36.5
Norway 8.7 -20 Ireland 41.2 -62.4 %
Table 3.1: Trend in total employment and unemployment rate in the whole economy, 1995-2003
1. 1995-2001. 2. 1995-2002.
Source: OECD, STAN and LFS database.
Table 3.2
Optimal subsidy βJ = 1.8 βJ = 1.2 βJ = 0.6 Closed Economy
τ = 2 0.315 0.305 0.28 0.33
τ = 4 0.311 0.314 0.324 0.314
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A




(b) Cost Saving for Different Offshoring Cost Functions
t'(I)
 
        t'(J) Market Tightness
(c) When Offshoring Technology Makes Progress in the Service sector, t′(J)
increases.
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Appendix A: Chapter 1
A.1 Social Planner’s Objective
A.1.1 Optimal α









VE(αs)f(αs)dα + usVU ]ds
As we have the welfare of unemployed and employed workers as
VU =
hα(1 + r)(w − 12α)
r(r + δ + hα)
=
vα(1 + r)(w − 12α)










The dynamics of unemployment rate is
.
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We can now write down the Hamiltonian











vα(1 + r)(w − 12α)
r[(r + δ)(1 − λ(1− α)) + vα]





We only focus on the steady state. Next, we can write down the FOC
∂H
∂α











2(λ(r + δ) + v) + (1− λ)(r + δ)(w − α)]
















vα(1 + r)(w − 12α)




] = ϕr (A.6)
Then we can obtain the ϕ
ϕ =
−(1 + r)(w − 12α)
[1−λ(1−α)]
[(r+δ)(1−λ(1−α))+vα]


















2(λ(r + δ) + v) + (1− λ)(r + δ)(w − α)]




(1 + r)(w − 12α)
[1−λ(1−α)]
[(r+δ)(1−λ(1−α))+vα]
r + δ + vα1−λ(1−α)
= 0 (A.8)
This condition defines the socially optimal condition and we obtain optimal α . In the
equilibrium α is determined by the equation
v(αE)2
1− λ(1− αE)
+ 2(r + δ)αE = 2(r + δ)w
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= 0, then we can conclude
that the equilibrium is social optimum, if ∂H
∂α
> 0, then social planner prefers higher α
than equilibrium, if ∂H
∂α
< 0, then social planner prefers lower α than equilibrium. Then
the first order condition becomes
∂H
∂α










(r + δ)λαE(αE + 2(w − αE))




(1 + r)(w − 12α
E) 1
[(r+δ)(1−λ(1−αE))+vαE ]








(1− u) + u
v(1− λ)
[1− λ(1− α)]
(1 + r)(w − 12α)
1
[(r+δ)(1−λ(1−α))+vα]
r + δ + vα1−λ(1−α)
(A.10)
Since in the equilibrium we have
v(αE)2
1− λ(1− αE)




[(r + δ)(1 − λ(1− αE)) + vαE ]
=
αE
2(r + δ)[(1 − λ(1− αE))]
(A.12)
What is more, the unemployment rate in the steady state is
u =
δ[1− λ(1− α)]
δ[1− λ(1− α)] + (1− δ)vα
(A.13)





[δ(1 − λ(1− αE)) + (1− δ)vαE ]
+ u
v(1 − λ)(1 + r)
[(r + δ)(1 − λ(1− αE)) + vαE]
αE





[δ(1 − λ(1− αE)) + vαE]
[r(1− λ(1− αE)) + vαE + δλαE ]
[(r + δ)(1 − λ(1− αE)) + vαE]
(A.14)




(α = αE) < 0
What is more, we can observe from equation (43) that the second order derivative is
negative, therefore we can conclude that social planner prefers that workers are more
selective than that in the equilibrium.
Appendix B
Appendix B: Chapter 2
B.1 Impact of Two-tier Unemployment Compensation Poli-
cies
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B.1.1 Sensitivity Analysis
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B.1.2 Different Weights on Different Groups
Anticipating the relationship between the wage demand for workers, and the labor
market equilibrium, union chooses w to maximize the ex ante welfare of its members
(2− k)r(VE,e−VU,e)Le + kr(VE,n−VU,n)Ln. The rent of entitled employed workers and
non-entitled employed workers are given respectively as







(r + d+mθq(θ))− λmθq(θ) 1
r+λ+σ
(B.1)
VE,n − VU,n =







(r + λ+ σ)− λmθq(θ) 1
r+d+mθq(θ)
(B.2)
And we have 2 constraints, one is equilibrium job creation condition
Aγ(Le + Ln)




Another one is from the fact that the sum of employed and unemployed workers qual




)Le + (1 +
λ+ σ
mθq(θ)
)Ln = 1 (B.4)
The union’s objective is to choose the right wage level w in order to maximize (2 −
k)r(VE,e − VU,e)Le + kr(VE,n − VU,n)Ln given the two constraints (22) and (23)





+ ϕ[1 − (1 +
λ
d+mθq(θ)




The first order conditions are
∂L
∂Le




) = 0 (B.5)
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∂L
∂Ln
= kr(VE,n − VU,n)− ψAγ(1 − γ)(Le + Ln)
γ−2 − ϕ(1 +
λ+ σ
mθq(θ)






((2− k)Le + kLn)(1− t)− ψ = 0 (B.7)




r+λ+mθq(θ)(1− t)Aγ(1− γ)(Le + Ln)




Pluging (44) and (45) into (42 ) yields the following expression for wage
[(1−t)∗(2−k−
mθq(θ)(λ+ d+mθq(θ))k
(d +mθq(θ))(mθq(θ) + λ+ σ)
)−(2−k)(be−
d(be − bn)





(d+mθq(θ))(mθq(θ) + λ+ σ)
(−bn +
σλ(be − bn)








And we also have one budget constraint which is
bewue + bnwun = (wne + wnn)t (B.10)
This constraint means that the unemployment benefit and social security are covered by
taxation. As we know the wage equation, we have the first equilibrium condition. We





, so these five equations form our equilibrium conditions and we have



































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure B.4: Impacts of bn.
Table B.1: A 10% rise in σ (%)
w u ue un
Collective Bargaining -0.34 -5.54 -3.26 -10.4
Individal Bargaining -0.006, -0.4 0.035 0.37 -1.05
Table B.2: A 10% rise in d (%)
w u ue un
Collective Bargaining -0.2 −3.26 -5.1 0.67
Individal Bargaining -0.02, 0.133 −0.4 -2.62 6.65
Table B.3: A 10% rise in be (%)
w u ue un
Collective Bargaining 0.63 10.73 6.7 19.3
Individal Bargaining 0.08, -0.47 0.93 0.7 1.69
Table B.4: A 10% rise in bn (%)
w u ue un
Collective Bargaining -0.033 −0.54 -0.355 -0.95
Individal Bargaining 0.0023, 0.046 0.065 0.048 0.12
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C.1 Social Optimum













− cV DY − c
FV FY − cV
D
X − c
FV FX + µ1(q(θX)V
D
X − δlD,X) + µ2(q(θY )V
D
Y − δlD,Y )
µ3(V
F
X − δlF,X) + µ4(V
F
Y − δlF,Y ) (C.1)
If we only consider the steady state, we have the following eight first order conditions
∂H
∂V FY
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∂H
∂V FX




















































)ρF (I) = b+ (r + δ + φmθY q(θY ))
c
(1 − φ)q(θY )
(C.10)




And in the service sector, we have the same equilibrium conditions, so we do not write
them here. Since social planner, in deciding how many vacancies to post and how extent
to offshore, does take into account the effect of his choices on workers who can move













F (J)(1 − J)
F (I)(1 − I)
]1−γ(1− I)1−γF (I)































Table C.1: Calibration Parameter Values for Belgium
Parameter Interpretation Value Source
Normalized Parameters
P Aggregate price level 1
A0 = A1 Aggregate productivity parameter 1
N Size of labor force 1
External parameter estimates and parameters matched to moments in the data
r Monthly discount rate 0.008 Van der Linden et al. (2001)
φ Elasticity of matching function 0.4 Van der Linden et al. (2001)
δ Job worker seperation rate 0.013 Van der Linden et al. (2001)
b Unemployment benefit 0.35 OECD (1999)
θ Labor market tightness 0.14 Van der Linden et al. (2001)
m Scale parameter of matching function 0.35 Obtained from u = δ
δ+mθ0.4 and θ
η Bargaining power of workers 0.77 Van der Linden et al. (2001)
γ Production function parameter 0.64 Benlolila and St.Paul (2003)
βI Non-task-specific offshoring cost in manufacturing sector 1.5 Felbermayr et al (2011)
βJ Non-task-specific offshoring cost in service sector Free to match βI(1 + I)
τ = βJ(1 + J)
τ
ρ Weight parameter 0.476 Estimate by using OECD I −O data
c Vacancy cost Free to match u = 0.09, I = 0.38
w∗ Foreign wage Free to match u = 0.09, I = 0.38











































































(a) Flat cost function t(i) = (1 + i)2
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